Lack of data got intelligence on Iraq 'all wrong'

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Weak human intelligence-gathering capability and limited data prevented U.S. intelligence analysts from figuring out that Iraq did not have large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, the CIA's former chief arms inspector told Congress yesterday.

"It turns out we were all wrong, probably, in my judgment, and that is most disturbing," David Kay told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

"I believe that the effort that has been directed to this point has been sufficiently intense that it is highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed, militarized chemical and biological weapons there," said Mr. Kay, who resigned earlier this month as director of the Iraq Survey Group.

The testimony set off a debate among Republican and Democrat committee members over whether the Bush administration used faulty intelligence as a basis for going to war in Iraq.

"When lives are at stake and our military is going to be placed in harm's way -- in other words, when we decide to go to war -- it is totally unacceptable to have intelligence that is this far off or to exaggerate or shape intelligence for any purpose by anybody," said Sen. Carl Levin, Michigan Democrat and ranking member of the committee.

Committee Chairman Sen. John W. Warner, Virginia Republican, defended the Bush administration and said hidden arms might yet be found.

"We better not pronounce 'we're all wrong' yet, because I think until we have finished the work ... I think we better hold such conclusion in abeyance," Mr. Warner said.

Iraq was found to be working on chemical, biological and nuclear arms "on a large scale," Mr. Warner said.

Mr. Kay said the Iraqi government's cheating and lying to United Nations contributed to the intelligence failure because it led analysts to jump to false conclusions.