Decision time in Iraq

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One key objective of the Baghdad Security Plan designed by Gen. David Petraeus was to restore stability, if not civility, to Iraqi life. This was to be accomplished by halting the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from their western Baghdad neighborhoods and securing the capital's central area on both sides of Tigris River. Once these military goals had been achieved, vitally needed infrastructure services to the community could be restored.

So far, Gen. Petraeus' counterinsurgency plan has achieved moderate success. According to a recent study by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, ethnic violence has decreased, schools have been renovated and reopened, local street cleaners have been hired, and sewage systems are being rebuilt. In Anbar Province, the indigenous Sunni sheiks have recently allied themselves with American forces to fight against al Qaeda among Iraq's terrorists.

Indeed, what is occurring both in Baghdad and Ramadi could become the template to be applied elsewhere in Iraq. The key to sustaining the Ramadi success story rests with the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. However, all the above improvements in security, infrastructure and economic activity have so far been dependent upon U.S. military funds. Iraq's central government has not been involved.

And yet the people of Ramadi want their government's help. Now that the shooting has come under control, they want their basic services restored. They are requesting infrastructure -- electricity, water, sewage and reopened schools. They want reconstruction funds. But because of sectarian pressures, the Shia-dominant Iraqi government is not anxious to provide these basic services for Anbar's overwhelmingly Sunni population.

For too many Iraqi legislators, their constitution amounts to nothing more than words on paper. Sectarian, tribal and clan relationships influence what happens more than what is best for Iraq. It must be hugely frustrating for Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Gen. Petraeus to realize that tribalism, not reconciliation, still determines what the Iraqi government will -- and will not -- do.

For the Baghdad Security Plan to achieve full success demands proactive movement by Prime Minister al-Maliki. Gen. Petraeus has repeatedly stated that the success of America's attempt to create a climate of stability in Iraq will not be delivered by military action alone but through the political arena. Yet this prime minister, who must reform his administration and take courageous nation-building actions to ensure a politically stable environment, has so far been incapable or unwilling to put Iraq, the nation, ahead of Iraq, the tribal society.

That is why we can no longer wait for Mr. al-Maliki. We need a plan that bypasses Mr. al-Maliki's sectarianized government and restores stability by empowering the Iraqis themselves. One approach could replicate what is taking place in Anbar -- that is, using Iraq's tribalized society to engender stability, locale by locale.

First, we would identify Sunni and Shia tribal leaders who have the courage to join with our forces for the common objective of eliminating al Qaeda in Iraq, restoring security for their people, and rebuilding their shattered communities. Provided that those local elders are willing to cooperate the way the sheiks in Ramadi have done, funds would be made available through the U.S. military to restore basic services and infrastructure. As long as the cooperation and the progress continue, so does the money. If this approach gains traction, then it could become the template for similar programs on a nationwide basis. But to ensure the initiative's success, the outlaw elements that foster sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing must be dealt with immediately and decisively.

Al Qaeda's foreign fighters must be eradicated and the Syrians must become convinced that it is not in their national interest to give jihadis safe passage through their territory. This can be done by employing American air power combined with technical means. A concerted effort must also be made to identify and neutralize those sectarian militia elements that have infiltrated Iraqi security forces, police units and the ministry of the Interior. Sadr City must be sealed off and the Mahdi Army eradicated -- development that will render its radical leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, irrelevant to the political process.

We now have hard evidence of Iran's complicity in supplying deadly, shaped explosive devices to Shia as well as Sunni extremists. These IEDs are getting more powerful and causing more casualties to U.S. forces than ever before. We can no longer ignore Iran's declaration of war against the United States which has been ongoing since November 1979. Our forces are dying as a direct result of Iran providing IEDs, training and support to the extremists. United Nations and other diplomatic discussions will simply be ignored by Iran, as they have in the past. Iran must become convinced that continued support of destabilization in Iraq will cost them more than they have to gain.

Now is the time to put real pressure on Tehran by using a multifaceted approach that combines the military's "big stick," meaningful economic sanctions, and quiet support to those millions of Iranians who detest the mullahs and their repressive regimes. We should respond with surgical tactical strikes against key infrastructure economic targets in Iran for every major IED attack against our forces. We owe our soldiers and Marines laying their lives on the line each day the assurance that we will take whatever action is necessary to eliminate this threat.

James A. Lyons Jr., a retired admiral, served as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He was senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations and was deputy chief of naval operations, where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters.