The failed Moscow talks

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Last Friday and Saturday, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Moscow. They met with President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov, for what are known as the "2 + 2 talks." These were agreed upon in Kennebunkport, Maine, between Presidents George W. Bush and Mr. Putin. The Moscow talks did not go well.

Before the talks started, Mr. Putin made Miss Rice and Mr. Gates wait for him for 40 minutes — a deliberate diplomatic slight. Greeting the two senior U.S. Cabinet members in front of TV cameras, Mr. Putin came out adamantly against deployment of the U.S. component of the global ballistic missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic.

"The one thing on which I would like to focus attention is that in the process of these difficult negotiations we hope that you will not force through previous agreements with eastern European countries," the ITAR-TASS news agency quoted Mr. Putin as saying.

As Miss Rice and Mr. Gates were visiting Moscow, the Russian capital was in the midst of two overlapping political games: the overt Duma and presidential election cycle of December 2007-March 2008, and the mostly covert power struggle between competing pro-Putin factions over the architecture of the next Russian regime.

In it, competing factions such as the Russian Federal Security Service and the Anti-Narcotics Committee — both headed by Mr. Putin's loyalists — are lobbing op-eds at each other, but, more significantly, arresting each other's senior officers and generals.

At stake is not just power, but control of tens of billions of dollars in property and state-owned enterprises, including oil, gas, other commodities, weapons, shipping, autos and aerospace industries.

Every move the Putin administration makes today is dictated by the desire to shape Russia's future internal power structure and to set the course for the country's foreign and security affairs in general, and its relationship with the United States in particular for years to come.

Keeping the relationship with Washington on the verge of a crisis and inventing an imaginary "American enemy" is creating much needed legitimacy for the current Russian leadership, which now has only Mr. Putin's personal popularity as its political base.

The image of Russia surrounded by enemies is absolutely necessary for today's Russian ruling class of senior secret police officers, as it positions them in the eyes of the people as the saviors and defenders of Mother Russia.

This approach has venerable roots in Russian history, hearkening back to the Romanov police state of the 19th and early 20th centuries or even Ivan the Terrible's rule of the late 16th century.