Prioritizing NATO

Of the several issues vying for attention at this week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Bucharest, one stands out. The war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda is, has been, and will continue to be the existential test of NATO’s relevance.

Putting it baldly, thus far the alliance has failed in Afghanistan. It has failed to distribute the security burden proportionately as the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorates. It has failed quite demonstrably to quash a resurgent Taliban, which defies the world’s best militaries and poses grave renewed threats to Afghan security and to the West. Inexplicably, this experience has not convinced major European partners that the future of the alliance depends on this mission’s success. Nor do these nations show much cognizance that a return to the bad old days of the 1990s poses a significant threat to their own security.

As of this month, the 47,000-strong International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan consists of the following: 19,000 U.S. troops, 7,750 from the United Kingdom, 3,490 Germans, 2,500 Canadians, 2,360 Italians, 1,730 Dutch, and 1,430 Frenchmen. Thirty-three nations round out the remaining numbers with deployments, ranging from the single digits to around 1,000. Some major NATO partners maintain explicit or de facto policies to prohibit engaging in real hostilities — most prominently Germany — a product of these countries’ complacent domestic politics. (The United States maintains even today a force in Germany 18 to 19 times the size of the German Afghan contingent.) Several months ago, President Bush asked NATO partners for 7,500 additional troops. The United States ended up supplying 3,000 U.S. Marines when NATO partners promised only a fraction of the requested deployment.

None of this is to suggest that the roster of remaining issues in Bucharest are unimportant. Tensions over Ukraine and Georgia entrance plans are significant. European acceptance of a missile-defense shield would be a major development. So would the accession of the three prospective Balkan NATO entrants of Croatia, Albania and Macedonia, as evidence of progress in that corner of Europe as they come to enjoy European security guarantees.

But judge the seriousness of the Bush administration, and of France, Germany and the United Kingdom by whether these parties show results in Afghanistan. This is particularly true regarding France. It seeks new leadership roles, which include rejoining NATO’s command structure. One down payment could be an increase over France’s Afghan deployment. The war there is, after all, NATO’s existential question. It must come first.