HUESSY: Playing games with U.S. security

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By Peter Huessy

OP-ED:

Few Americans would doubt maintaining nuclear deterrence is job No. 1 for an American president. But what of a candidate for the office who refuses to support programs to keep our nuclear deterrent strong? What if a candidate was proposing changes in our nuclear posture that had the potential of seriously undermining the credibility of that deterrent? We still live in an uncertain world. China and Russia continue to modernize their nuclear forces with new missiles, submarines and warheads. Rogue-state sponsors of terror, such as Iran and North Korea, have nuclear weapons or are sprinting toward such a capability. During the Cold War, the United States maintained an uneasy balance of terror with the Soviet Union. Some called this mutual assured destruction or by its acronym, MAD.

Some have claimed there is little to worry about. If the United States could deter the Soviets with 10,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, what's the problem with a North Korea or Iran with perhaps half a dozen? Ted Turner, the founder of CNN, once quipped "If the United States has a couple of thousand nuclear weapons, why can't Iran have a dozen?" Recently, a number of prominent American statesmen, led by former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Secretary of State George Schultz, have called for the "elimination of nuclear dangers," most notably the threat of nuclear terrorism by setting a goal of zero nuclear weapons.

They want to accelerate Nunn-Lugar (named after the two original Senate sponsors) to secure the thousands of tons of nuclear material and warheads in the former Soviet Union. In fact, over the past seven years, the United States has doubled the joint European and U.S. funding to $2 billion annually. They want a fissile-material cutoff. So does the Bush administration. Thus, on both these elements, many can agree.

But other proposals rest on more shaky ground. For example, Mr. Perry has called for very significant reductions in nuclear weapons on the way to zero. Barack Obama, too, has called for 600 deployed weapons with 450 Minuteman missiles off-alert. But then he proposes going to zero nuclear weapons as well. That compares to the 1,700-2,200 now deployed. Ironically, when the Bush-era Moscow treaty is completed, our reduced nuclear stockpile will be down to the level during the Eisenhower administration.

But nowhere has there been an operational plan developed that would justify the conclusion that deterrence takes far fewer weapons than we have today. To put the 600-warhead level proposed by Mr. Obama into perspective, Richard Fisher, one of our nation's foremost China experts, notes that in the next decade, China could reach just such a number of deployed nuclear weapons.

The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Gen. Kevin Chilton, has testified that U.S. deterrent policy requires the current deployed level of nuclear warheads. In contrast, those who have pushed for far lower numbers have not justified them. Deterrence is, after all, not implemented by simply picking a number out of the air that both ends in zero and is simply less than we now have. This is especially dangerous when we need to both reassure our allies that our nuclear umbrella remains in place and keep away potential peer competitors.

But beyond the numbers, spokesmen for Mr. Obama have opposed every element of the current programs to revitalize our nuclear labs and maintain our deterrent, including the Reliable Replacement Warhead. This includes not testing any weapons.

John Holum, who spoke for Mr. Obama at an Arms Control Association meeting, said a ban on testing is not all bad. "We could test some of the 4,000 nuclear parts" of a weapon, he said. But what if we applied such a policy to all other defense weapons, including missile defense? You can test the parts but not when everything is put together? Or what if your neighborhood car dealer said, 'Well, ma'am, this is a great car. Haven't tested anything except the tires and fender, but it should work!' " More worrisome, Mr. Obama has called for de-alerting all of our 450 Minuteman III missiles - taking their warheads off and putting them in storage. This would effectively eliminate this critically important leg of our nuclear Triad. It would make it useless in a crisis, as it would take months to put even a few warheads back on alert. Thus we would be placing our entire security on the safety of our few submarines routinely at sea, having effectively eliminated hundreds of ICBMs capable of retaliation. In addition, is the senator saying he doesn't trust himself to positively control our Minuteman missiles and to avoid the temptation to fire them he is going to basically make them inoperable?

There is no way we are going to zero nuclear weapons anytime soon. But it is the height of folly to: 1) propose in the interim a nuclear deterrent force whose size is unrelated to the threat or our extended deterrent; 2) refuse to support elements needed to maintain our nuclear deterrent; and 3) advocate a force posture that eliminates the extraordinary contribution ICBMs make to our security and strategic stability.

Peter Huessy is president of GeoStrategic Analysis.