DE BORCHGRAVE: Jihadis at $9 a day

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By Arnaud de Borchgrave

COMMENTARY:

Pakistan is "betwixt and between," neither civilian nor military rule, caught between the generation that shied away from democracy and the generation that embraced it, though not yet wholeheartedly.

In fact, there is a power vacuum at the top and homegrown Taliban extremists are sowing death and destruction in Peshawar, the storied capital of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).

Before leaving for the United States to confer with President Bush this coming weekend, Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani flew to Peshawar for an emergency grand tribal jirga on what to do about a rapidly deteriorating situation. "Militancy and terrorism have plunged the entire region into a crisis and tribal leaders should help the government in curbing militancy," he told the assembled elder maliks from the seven lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where Taliban and al Qaeda enjoy privileged sanctuaries.

"You elders should talk to the militants to renounce insurgency," Mr. Gilani pleaded. "Those who lay down arms are our friends and those who challenge the government betray the country ... our children need books and pencils, not suicide jackets." Some 150 Maliks have been executed by the Taliban, 62 of them for daring to speak out against the Taliban.

Youngsters are recruited by the Taliban and paid 1,000 rupees a day, or $9, to become jihadis. Would-be jihadi "martyrs" get the princely sum of $120, a big number in a part of the world where only 16 percent of the men and 3 percent of the women can read, and where there is no economic activity in parts of FATA and NWFP.

In a teleconference organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Malik Naveed Khan, the inspector general of police for NWFP, which shares borders with all seven "tribal agencies," expressed alarm over the Taliban's raids out of FATA into his own province. "Peshawar," he said, "is threatened on several sides."

He said "it's like fighting the shadows of an invisible army. We're poor on the mobility side. We now have 500 constables being trained in anti-terrorist tactics but they won't be on the ground for a year. ... Forty percent of our police force is not even in police buildings so they can't defend themselves when attacked."

The Taliban moves in fast vehicles carrying heavily armed fighters that outrun and outgun the police. In broad daylight, they torch barber shops where men are being shaved, as well as girls schools. There is also much looting and kidnapping for ransom.

In the last three years, the Taliban has twice ignored deals signed with both the Pakistani military and the provincial governor. The Taliban movement is split in two: those whose main objective is Afghanistan, where they were defeated by the U.S. invasion in October 2001, and another wing whose target is NWFP and Baluchistan, which both border on Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan's other two provinces, Punjab and Sindh.

Asked about his most immediate needs, provincial Police Chief Khan said, "we need concrete international intervention in the shortest possible time," but he then quickly added he did not mean U.S. boots on the ground. American fighters would simply turn the whole country against the United States.

For a short-term quick fix, he explained, "we need choppers, APCs, bulletproof vests, job opportunities for the youth that are recruited by Taliban. We need something like what saved America from the Great Depression. We need $500 million a year for the next 10 years to build infrastructure" to make NWFP and FATA a sustainable economic development zone. The idea is to absorb FATA in NWFP and allow Pakistan's principal political parties to campaign in the tribal areas.

Neither the provincial police nor the paramilitary Frontier Corps could possibly absorb choppers with trained pilots in less than a year. This leaves the field to a Pakistani army that was bloodied by the Taliban in FATA over the last three years and wants no part of what soldiers regard as a civil war.

The police chief for NWFP said the answer was a special force of 100,000 volunteers to confront the militants. "Everybody in the frontier areas is armed," he explained, "so now we must motivate them against the militants." The Pakistani government doesn't have a clear strategy for FATA, neither short nor long-term.

Before leaving for Washington, Prime Minister Gilani announced a 30 percent increase in the annual development program, including electricity, for FATA. That would still be peanuts given the magnitude of huge dirt-poor areas. Mr. Gilani also announced 100 new Lungi (turban) holders - tribal elders - in each of the seven tribal areas, as well as an increase in the Lungis' allowance.

Two tribal elders of the Mamond tribe in the Bajaur agency never made it to the Peshawar pow-wow with Mr. Gilani. Their car was ambushed. It was the sixth attempt on Malik Shahjehan in two years. He had taken a stand against "foreign militants" - i.e., al Qaeda volunteers - in Bajaur. He also opposed the government's plan to abolish or amend the British-era Frontier Crime Regulation, legalese for the safe haven enjoyed by criminals from the rest of Pakistan, who know they cannot be pursued by federal authorities in FATA. This attack, Shahjehan did not survive. The second elder was critically injured.

Why is all this critically important? Pakistan is one of the world's eight nuclear powers.

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.