Few comforts, much danger for outpost GIs

COMBAT OUTPOST KEATING, Afghanistan — | Entombed by steep faces of jagged rock, this coalition outpost deep in the Afghan borderlands plays a role as grim as it looks: drawing the attention of insurgents flocking from tribal areas in nearby Pakistan.

The machine-gun, mortar and rocket-propelled-grenade (RPG) fire usually subsides in the winter, when the insurgents go home. These days, however, local militants stoke the fight. They find refuge in caves and villages whose fiercely independent residents say the presence of U.S.-led forces is the root of the problem.

“Right now, we´re like the ring of a boxing ring,” said Army Capt. Daniel Pecha, who took over command of Combat Outpost Keating after his predecessor was killed in late October.

In many ways, the scenario is emblematic of the war at large. Reconstruction efforts have stalled under a weak and corrupt central government that relies on foreign backers to do what it cannot. The Taliban and a host of other groups have filled the vacuum of public discontent, diverting critical Western resources and manpower into combat operations that grind on.

In the Kamdesh area, insurgents have shut down the supply road that connects the outpost to the poor mountain villages once serviced by a U.S. military Provincial Reconstruction Team. Projects have dried up, as have United Nations food and relief deliveries. The constant threat of enemy attack ensures that patrols do not range far.

According to Col. John Spiszer, commander of the 1st Infantry Division’s 3rd Brigade in northeastern Afghanistan, the situation is still viable because it allows development to move forward in more strategic population centers. Over the past year, he points out, the United States has spent more than $80 million in an operations area that includes the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar, the most hostile in the country.

“It’s hard to maintain, but we can do it,” said the colonel, adding that the U.S. military can maintain forces in places like Kamdesh more easily than the enemy. “Part of the counterinsurgency is persistence, and it takes time. We’re making strides, but they’re very slow.”

At COP Keating, it´s literally an uphill battle.

Given their low-lying position at the base of a ravine carved by the Landay River, members of B Troop, 6-4 Cavalry train their weapons at a 45-degree angle during firefights, shooting up into the trees where insurgents creep almost unseen.

Some rock outcroppings used as firing points have been dynamited completely. On the southern flank, a line of red flags just outside the razor wire less than 30 yards away shows how close the insurgents have come.

The attacks average about one a week, often at nightfall. They last anywhere from a few minutes to several hours, not counting harassment fire, at random times of day, meant to keep coalition forces off balance.

Last month, a pre-noon explosion drew puzzled looks from a group of soldiers relaxing indoors, unsure if it was a mortar training drill or an incoming RPG. Word of an attack sent them scrambling for their body armor and M-4 rifles. It was over by the time they got outside.

“Once we get to our battle stations, they know they’re going to get pounded, so they usually hit us and then back off, just to get us riled up,” said Sgt. Mark Putnam. “It’s really frustrating.”

Most of the insurgents operating in Kamdesh are locals affiliated with the Hezb-e-Islami of former mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. While the locals are not as well-trained as other fighters, officers say the overall level of violence is steady because the insurgents don’t migrate back to rear bases beyond the Pakistani border, about 15 miles away, when the fighting season draws down.

So far, no coalition forces have been killed in engagements, but total exposure on all sides means ordinary activities, such as walking to the latrine or lifting weights in the rooftop gym, come with added risk.

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