Such technological advances may force the FAA to re-examine the way it does its job.
“We’ve gone from aviation to aerospace products that are much more complex,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aviation analyst with the Teal Group. “The FAA is equipped for aviation. Aerospace is another matter.”
“They need to make sure the certification process stays current with the industry and the new technology,” she said.
An FAA spokeswoman declined to comment for this article, referring instead to statements made during a news conference last week. Officials said then that the review of the 787 wouldn’t be limited to the Dreamliner’s batteries. FAA Administrator Michael Huerta said that the agency would “make sure that the approved quality control procedures are in place and that all of the necessary oversight is done.”
“We are confident in the regulatory process that has been applied to the 787 since its design inception,” said Boeing Co. spokesman Marc Birtel. “With this airplane, the FAA conducted its most robust certification process ever.”
A week ago, the FAA’s Mr. Huerta and Transportation Secretary LaHood endorsed the Dreamliner’s safety even as they ordered a new review of its design and construction following a fire in a lithium-ion battery on a 787 that had landed in Boston. Then, this past Wednesday, after a battery malfunction on a second plane resulted in an emergency landing, they grounded Dreamliner flights in the U.S.
In certifying new planes, the FAA relies heavily on information from the manufacturers. That system has worked — the U.S. commercial airline fleet is safer than ever — but it is coming under renewed scrutiny after the 787 incidents.
Experts say that FAA officials have no choice but to rely on information from aircraft manufacturers as key systems of the plane are designed and built.
“As a practical matter, they can’t do the testing,” said longtime aviation consultant Daniel Kasper of Compass Lexecon. “They don’t have the expertise in aircraft design, and they don’t have the budget — it would be too costly. They would have to be involved in every step.”
Thomas Anthony, director of the aviation-safety program at the University of Southern California, said that many new planes have flaws that are only discovered once they go into service and that the regulatory process worked the way it was supposed to with the Dreamliner.
“The FAA used to be accused of ‘blood priority’” — acting only after a disaster, Mr. Anthony said. “In this case, it’s not true. The regulators are taking their job seriously. There were no accidents; there were no injuries; there were no fatalities.”
That has not always been the case. In 1979, authorities grounded the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 for five weeks after an engine tore loose from the wing of an American Airlines plane, causing a crash that killed 273 in Chicago. And there were other incidents that occurred after the DC-10 was introduced in 1971, including cargo-door problems that forced one emergency landing and caused a Turkish Airlines crash that killed 346 in 1974.
Boeing, based in Chicago, is racing to find a fix to the Dreamliner’s battery systems and get the planes back in the air. It is still producing 787s but has stopped delivering them to customers.