- The Washington Times - Wednesday, August 6, 2003

While most of the attention paid to the recent September 11 report has focused on the 28 blanked-out pages supposedly detailing the actions of the House of Saud, a far more important player has escaped necessary scrutiny: the U.S. State Department.

Not because the diplomats at Foggy Bottom did anything overt — aside from issuing visas to the terrorists that should have been denied under the law — but because of what their obsession with “stability” has wrought: a world more amenable to tyranny and terrorism.

The State Department was the lead agency for combating terrorism before September 11, though the State Department cannot take the fall for stunning lapses in intelligence. But where the State Department deserves blame is for its inability to recognize — and its disturbing habit of “engaging” — evil.

Even as many other parts of the U.S. government were growing leery of Saddam Hussein in the late 1980s — particularly after the mass murder of the Kurds in northern Iraq — the State Department became the best friend Saddam had. Anywhere. The State Department defended Saddam’s interests inside the first Bush administration, pushing the president to establish closer ties with a man who had already shown an alarming propensity for terrorizing his own people.

Granted, many in the Reagan administration had argued for an alliance with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war — who can forget the photo of Rummy shaking the despot’s hand in 1983 — but the State Department was still shilling for Saddam after most others in the U.S. government finally recognized him as the threat that he actually was.

As glaring a mistake as it was to embrace Saddam well after he had shown his true colors — but before his tanks rolled into Kuwait — the State Department did not learn its lesson. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, the State Department was quick to feign ignorance about the brutal tactics of the new regime, while privately spreading the word that the group would bring all-important “stability” to the war-torn nation.

In fairness, a number of U.S. officials outside of the State Department believed that the United States should welcome the change in Afghanistan’s leadership. The Taliban successfully wined and dined many of Washington’s policy elites, and some were thoroughly charmed. But the State Department’s job is to know better. And, in fact, most of the rest of the world did know better.

After the Taliban grabbed control of Afghanistan, only four nations on earth that did not recognize the fallen Rabbanni government. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates all recognized the Taliban, and one country did not recognize either the Rabbanni regime or the Taliban: the United States.

Of course, even if the State Department had used maximum leverage on the Taliban, September 11 might have happened in exactly the same way. But we’ll never know. History might have played out differently had the State Department seen through the facade that the Taliban was a movement of religion students—in capturing most of Afghanistan, after all, they had done in two years what the Soviets failed to do in 10 — but maybe not. But such speculation is neither productive nor helpful.

Learning from past mistakes, however, is absolutely crucial. And that’s the problem. Over the years, the State Department has demonstrated no capacity for self-appraisal. It cannot admit mistakes, but more fundamentally, it does not look at its own actions to learn what changes need to be made. There is perhaps no more vivid illustration than the Visa Express saga.

After this columnist wrote a story last June about a program in Saudi Arabia that had let in three of the terrorists that was still open nine months after September 11, the State Department did two things: 1) it dropped the name “Visa Express”; and 2) it changed the description of the program on the Web site of the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh. That was it.

There was no attempt to reform or change the program that was allowing all residents in the country that sent us 15 of 19 September 11 terrorists to submit visa applications at private Saudi travel agencies. The State Department, in fact, wanted to expand to other nations a program that let in three of the terrorists in the three months it was in operation before September 11. It only closed the loophole in our border security — and grudgingly, at that — following a month of intense public pressure.

The State Department’s refusal to change its ways can be seen in its determination to continue “engaging” the Iranian mullahs, even though years of talks have yielded nothing but the regime’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and continued brutal repression of the Iranian people. Rather than taking a tough stand against the mullahs, the State Department’s number-two official, Richard Armitage, legitimized the oppressors by labeling Iran a “democracy” this February.

There’s one lesson that the State Department must learn before any other — one that should be painfully obvious given the State Department’s history of coddling despots in the name of “securing” America’s interests with “stability”: Security in tyrants is no security at all.

Joel Mowbray is a syndicated columnist.

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