- The Washington Times - Thursday, January 2, 2003

WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 (UPI) — As well known for its venality as its commitment to democracy, Venezuela's middle class long tolerated the corruptocracies alternately fielded by the country's two main and equally tainted political parties. This sector is now staging a crippling strike against populist President Hugo Chvez, aimed not so much at reforming his government, but at bringing it down.

The opposition's latest tactic is concentrated on a constitutional provision that, in fact, was drafted under Chvez, allowing Venezuelans to refuse to recognize any "authority that contradicts democratic values, principles and guarantees or impairs human rights."

But under Chvez, human rights violations have been relatively limited, compared to what they were in Argentina, Chile and Brazil, and few democratic values have been "impaired." Rather, it has been the opposition's end-justifies-the-means philosophy and its importuning the army to carry out its "mission" to overthrow Chvez, which threatens Venezuela's democratic fundamentals, as well as its oil industry.

Unquestionably, Chvez has been irritating, insulting, infuriating and confrontational, but arguably, he has adhered to democratic ground rules at least as faithfully as those opposed to his rule, and his failings are as much a matter of style as substance.

The president may now be turning the corner in his fight for survival if he can mobilize sufficient fuel and food to satisfy the nation's minimal needs. However, if he is ousted in the next few days — which is entirely possible — a far greater blow would be landed on Venezuela's democratic capabilities than on Chvez's personal destiny. For the poor, if he is overthrown, Chvez eternally will be revered as a leader who, though often not effectively, fought in their name, and not for individual benefit — another Simon Bolivar.

For the opposition, its anti-Chvez battering ram all too often has been propelled by mendacious arguments defending meretricious goals. It has featured specious ad hoc interpretations of the constitution and hysterical justifications for what essentially has often been its outrageous behavior.

The opposition has distorted as often as it has invented. Its current mission is to asphyxiate the economy by freezing oil output, which is Venezuela's lifeline.

This strategy includes refusing to honor the Supreme Court's decision ordering a temporary discontinuation of the nation's debilitating oil strike, in contrast to Chvez's compliance when the court ruled that control of the Caracas police be returned to the authority of Caracas Mayor Alfredo Pena, who is one of Chvez's political enemies.

The current stand-off between Chvez and the opposition results from the latter's decision, when convenient, to join Chvez in frustrating negotiations sponsored by the Organization of American States, while condemning the president and being the main stumbling block.

The opposition presents no program, except hatred of Chvez; it only barely is able to contain the craven personal ambition of a number of its highest leaders, including Carlos Fernandez and Carlos Ortega, who see themselves as being presidential.

With the crucial help of Venezuela's mainly yellow press, opposition figures distribute sometimes false and always inflammatory interpretations of events.

Therefore, it is not only the government that is jeopardizing the lives of Venezuelans by staging frenzied confrontations with militants on the other side; rather, it is the opposition that sedulously promotes class warfare as much as any group, with its slogans, chants and banners.

The opposition's leadership fears the implementation of legislation featuring a modest land reform program in which fallow or excessive holdings could be transferred to small farmers. Currently, 41 percent of the country's arable land is controlled by less than 5 percent of the population and, according to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Venezuela has one of the hemisphere's highest concentrations of wealth in the fewest hands. Its demographics indicate that about 65 percent of the population lives near or below the poverty line. From this segment comes Chvez's main support base, unlettered loyalists who will not easily return to past injustices or relinquish newly obtained benefits — for example, free meals for their school children.

The opposition accuses Chvez of consorting with terrorists, meaning that, like all of his predecessors, he has met with heads of other nations in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to discuss the oil cartel's pricing and production. Anti-Chavistas are on par with Miami's Cuban exile community in their virulent anti-Castro demonology. Some of the more compromised leaders of Venezuela's business and labor sectors are on weak moral ground when they threaten to indict Chvez for corruption even though he, unlike some of themselves, has no record of defrauding the public.

If there is to be a solution to Venezuela's present governance crisis, it must arise from the constitution, and not be imposed only from the street or a resort to arms.

One of the opposition's major sources for its lapses in credibility is its calculated naivet and its illogicality. It stages a political strike against the oil industry and then bemoans the fact that Chvez has the nerve to try to restore production by bringing in foreign or unlicensed substitute workers to produce and transport oil. It wails over the possibility of an environmental disaster or some costly accident due to relatively untrained replacement personnel, but doesn't face up to the fact that the dangers directly flow from anti-Chavista strategy.

The opposition also chronically lashes out at such basic institutions as the "Chvez-controlled" Supreme Court, and then, in passing, cites the court's numerous anti-Chvez rulings that have damaged the president's standing.

The same love/hate relationship exists with the constitution. The opposition sees no problem with its contrasting selective indignation or muscular praise — all very well, but this is not the typology of democratic practice.

All told, the opposition's current scenario poses a serious threat to Venezuela's organic institutions, for any non-constitutional solution will fatefully undermine the country's prospects for domestic peace and its precious tradition of political civility, while opening itself up to bitter infighting among the now united, but predictably, soon to be divided, victors, even if Chvez decides to step down. Of course, don't forget the constitutional role of Jose Vicente Rangel, the nation's vice-president, who would automatically replace the president if called upon to do so.

There may be a way out for patriotic Venezuelans. The opposition could wait until next August, when the very constitution it selectively touts provides for a binding referendum midway through a presidential term on the incumbency's continued tenure. But what happens if Chvez wins such a ballot? This will almost guarantee that the middle class, as it did in Colombia, will turn to vigilantism against the perceived leftist devils, and the epoch of death squads will be inaugurated. Or, the legislature could call for presidential elections earlier than 2006, even prior to next August. But, if the opposition is to triumph, it must do so lawfully and through the amendment process, and not through political chicanery or economic extortion.

As for Chvez, his friends must make him realize that he is partially to blame for failing his nation and his revolution. His excesses, indiscretions and immaturity have helped to make enemies out of former friends, and have jeopardized the enactment of the positive vision he had for a better, more democratic Venezuela.

It may not be too late. But from this moment onward, Chavez must temper his conduct with a wisdom and perspective he has thus far failed to exhibit. To begin with, he must come to believe that thousands of the people who have taken to the streets to demonstrate against his rule are worthy Venezuelans, capable of being assets rather than merely fulminating foes.

Give these people a chance. Settling matters by scorching Venezuela's basic institutions recalls the disastrous consequences for President Salvador Allende's Chile in 1973. There, imprudent Christian Democrats solicited the military to rid the country of its constitutional president in order to bring on their own anticipated rule, but instead they got 17 years of brutal repression. There is always a danger of history repeating itself.


(Larry Birns is the director of the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs, or COHA. Matthew Ward is a Research Fellow at COHA. Outside View commentaries are written for UPI by outside writers on subjects of public interest.)

Sign up for Daily Newsletters

Copyright © 2019 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

The Washington Times Comment Policy

The Washington Times welcomes your comments on Spot.im, our third-party provider. Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.


Click to Read More and View Comments

Click to Hide