Do we have enough people thinking like terrorists? Sure, we have groups that do this, but it’s not the kind of job career government people like, and so while these groups are generally formed in reaction to criticism for not having them, they are also generally not taken seriously enough, at least after the initial fanfare in setting them up.
The Defense Department is pretty good at it, however, and they call it “Predictive Analysis.” At Defense, it’s something that must be done to help plan for an extremely dynamic situation, such as on the battlefield.
From the terrorist’s standpoint, however, the battlefields are here, so we need to do much more predictive analysis at home unless we assume some miracle piece of high-tech intelligence, or some wonderfully reliable human source, will tell us where when and how to expect the next attack.
We shouldn’t bet on it. Our high-tech sensors aren’t much good against this illusive enemy and we have not penetrated terrorist cells as we must to get reliable inside information — in fact, we are probably years away from such a capability.
So, what are the likely scenarios for the next attack?
To begin this kind of analysis — and, thinking like a terrorist — we need to establish the planning factors and assumptions for the attack. Here are some:
(1) It must be both massive and symbolic, at least the size and significance of the September 11, 2001, attacks.
(2) It must be able to inflict large numbers of casualties, at least in the thousands.
(3) It must cause tremendous expense, both to recover from it and from its secondary economic effects.
(4) It must be against a relatively “soft” target, presenting no real obstacle to attack.
(5) It must be an attack that can be executed against multiple targets simultaneously.
(6) It must be executed in population centers, to achieve the maximum political and psychological effects.
(7) It must be executed using relatively “low tech” means, for example, high explosives, or more easily available poisons, biological or lower grade nuclear-based weapons.
(8) The persons executing the attack will be happy — if not eager — to die in the attack.
(9) The attacks will share similarity in target and the means used to attack. This simplifies planning.
(10) There will be relatively no way to defend against the attacks, even if they are anticipated in time and place.
There no doubt are other factors and assumptions in the terrorist planners’ heads, but this list includes those we have seen time after time in terrorist attacks against us and others around the world. The next one will probably be no different.
So, how is the attack likely to happen?
High on the terrorist planners’ list would be an attack against subways in major East Coast cities. It would not be hard to plan or execute this kind of attack, expecting several thousand casualties. Such an attack could be initiated underground, with human-carried high explosives, perhaps followed with a biological or chemical weapon application of some kind.
Another attack scenario would be shoulder-fired, air-to-air missiles, aimed at airliners, around major airports, as the planes were in low final approach or just lifting off. Again, these would be relatively easy to plan and carry out simultaneously.
Targeting “inbound” international airliners as targets or using them as suicide strike vehicles remains very tempting for terrorist groups. And there are several scenarios that reduce our ability to prevent or inhibit such an attack.
While we must do our best to anticipate how the next attack might come, we will forever be vulnerable to most of them unless we develop good human intelligence sources within the terror cells themselves. This requires a very long-term funding commitment from Congress , and, above all, new and dynamic intelligence leadership. In the meantime, we need a whole new emphasis on “predictive analysis” here at home.
We must act quickly — because we can be assured the attacks described above are in some stage of advanced planning — and perhaps all three of them.
Daniel J. Gallington is a senior research fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Va. He last served in government as deputy assistant defense secretary for territorial security. Earlier, he was general counsel for the Senate Select Intelligence Committee and Justice Department deputy counsel for intelligence policy.
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