A workable strategy

OPINION:

Though not called it, World War II was a “great” war. Good triumphed over evil. Enemies became friends as Japan and Germany grew into democracies. And ultimately, allies who grew into enemies — Russia and China — at least re-emerged as potential partners and not yet permanent threats.

We had a strategy — hold in the Pacific, win in the Atlantic first — and powerful allies in the Red Army that kept Hitler bloodied and at bay in the east. Nations were united and unified. And we had the collective wisdom and compassion not to leave the defeated powers to fester and arise as enemies.

With the onslaught of primaries and national elections, politics in the United States has moved to hyper-spin. That spin spills over of course into foreign policy and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and now into fears about Pakistan’s future. Neither the president nor the administration has succumbed to declaring the surge in Iraq as “mission accomplished.” However, the administration and its fiercest supporters are certainly suggesting that image as violence in Iraq has declined, in large measure due to the additional 30,000 U.S. forces.

Opponents and the Democratic contenders for president grudgingly admit that there has been some progress on the ground. However, they point out that the purpose of the surge was to give “breathing space” for the Iraqi government to achieve political reconciliation, a work still very much in progress. What is needed, to borrow John McCain’s famous phrase, is some “straight talk.” And with that straight talk, a lesson or two from that “great” war also applies.

On a tactical level, the surge has indeed reduced violence and casualties to all sides, including our own. However, as the United States failed to cope with the postwar period in Iraq after Saddam Hussein fell, discussion over what happens after the surge is over is missing in action. And even in the highly unlikely event the surge is extended, the “then what” question remains.

Three pieces of straight talk are vital. Each shows the magnitude of the problems Iraq faces if it is to become a stable, let alone free, state. The first is its constitution that makes political reconciliation difficult if not impossible under current conditions. The second is the centrifugal forces that continue to divide Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds. And the third is the collection of antibodies produced by the surge that block reconciliation.

Senior Iraqis representing the cross-section of society readily acknowledge that the constitution in practice allows the Shi’ites to dominate politically. That dominance exacerbates the inter and intra divisions among Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds. And local or regional Sunni forces in Anbar province, empowered and equipped by the United States to take on al Qaeda, have no loyalty to the government in Baghdad.

As a result, political stalemate in Iraq at lower levels of violence is probably the best possible outcome. Of course, what happens as U.S. forces are reduced could greatly upset that balance for the worst. At the same time, the situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate both in political support by the NATO allies for sustained presence and in terms of the failure of reforms in the civil sector to take hold. And, turmoil and violence in Pakistan post-assassination of Benazir Bhutto show little sign of abating.

What should we take away from the great war and apply here? First, we need a strategy. It is time to take the “hold and win” and reverse our priorities. The strategic center of gravity has shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. We probably can “hold” in Iraq even with substantial troop reductions. “Winning” is not the correct goal in Afghanistan. However, making that region our top priority is.

That will require what helped us to win World War II: powerful allies. And that means shifting to a regional solution for the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran imbroglio. Finally, after the great war, we did not completely win the peace. However, we did not do that badly. We need to think through what can be achieved in the region, not merely what we wish. More straight talk is needed here, too.

In this regional approach, U.S. presence could be lessened, possibly reducing the negative consequences, particularly in Pakistan in which the Musharraf government, rightly or wrongly, is seen as our lapdog. This can be done by bringing in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (that includes China and Russia); India; Iran; NATO; and possibly the United Nations and the European Union. The aim is to ensure civil reforms work in Afghanistan; that Pakistan and Iran appreciate it is in their best interests for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan; and that the insurgency and related extremism in Pakistan be contained as the best check on al Qaeda.

Now that would be both straight talk and a strategy that could actually work.