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Iran's checkmate

By Ali Safavi
March 18, 2008

That Tehran will not pay any heed to the third UN Security Council resolution condemning its drive to acquire nuclear weapons, stems not from the mullahs' prowess nor the ineffectiveness of the sanctions. Quite simply, the supreme leader Ali Khamenei is hell-bent on getting the bomb.

Any doubt? Take a look at the results of the March 14 Parliamentary (Majlis) elections, which a significant majority of Iranians shunned. The figures announced so far bear out what was expected long before the first ballot was cast: The supreme leader's men have captured more than two-thirds of the seats.

In what was dubbed as "engineering the elections," Khamenei and his handpicked President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad devised a sophisticated scheme early on to purge key candidates belonging to the factions affiliated with former presidents Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami (the so-called reformers), while allowing those, which have either no chance of winning or little weight even if elected, to remain in the race to prevent a similar boycott as four years ago, when less than 10 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots.

Out of nearly 7,600 prospective candidates, the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council disqualified no less than 2,700 candidates. Four former ministers, 30 deputy ministers, 10 governors and 73 Majlis deputies were among those receiving the ax. One-thousand others withdrew their names, knowing full well that they could get past the watchdog agencies.

As things stand now, even if all of the remaining rival candidates make it to the Majlis, they would end up with no more than 50 seats in the 290-seat Parliament, and will be in no position to challenge the pro-Khamenei faction's controlling power.

Clearly, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are keen to grab every single lever of power by allowing the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to gradually slither into and eventually dominate the regime's main power centers.

Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, the IRGC commander in chief, speaking at the convention of IRGC's paramilitary Bassij Force, held in February, clearly stated, "If the Bassij desires a role in the elections — which I believe it does with the blessings of the Supreme Leader — it should safeguard, complete and expand the trend which has already been set in motion."

Ironically, the regime's attempts to solidify its own rule are wrought with unprecedented complications. The purge of rival factions in the midst of the Majlis election process is an indication that the regime feels immensely vulnerable and weak, prompting it to close ranks.

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