Dread not the DD(X)

I have followed with interest the debate in The Washington Times sparked by Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton’s article on the June 13 Op-Ed page on the need for the Navy to focus on getting the DD(X), the next generation destroyer, out into the fleet rather than bringing back our nation’s two remaining serviceable battleships, vessels historically referred to as “dreadnoughts.”

Adm. Hamilton’s article was criticized by James O’Bryon (June 17) and Dennis Reilly (June 21), both of whom tout perceived advantages of the battleship over DD(X) technologies.

I have a personal interest in the DD(X) as this new class of warship will be named after my late father, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. Accordingly, I feel it appropriate to assess the Zumwalt Class DD(X) from the same perspective as would he. After all, in 1966 my father was the Navy’s first director of Systems Analysis and was responsible for analyzing competing weaponry systems to ensure the Navy got the biggest bang for its buck. His honest assessments, regardless of the politics involved, earned him both respect and criticism. Time eventually proved his assessments right.

I sense Adm. Hamilton, in similarly providing an honest, albeit unpopular (in view of the battleship’s popular “mystique”), assessment of the DD(X) versus the battleship, is suffering such criticism but that time will prove him right as well.

A comprehensive systems analysis approach to this issue involves weighing numerous cost factors — hidden as well as directly related to hard costs of a battleship’s modernization.

The defense budget’s costliest element is manpower. An Iowa Class battleship requires a 1,500-member crew. That many sailors could man 10 DD(X) destroyers. No one on active duty in the Navy is trained to operate a battleship’s steam plant, weapons and fire-control systems. Training personnel to do so would involve a costly expansion of the Navy’s school system.

There are limited shipyard facilities capable of handling larger warships like battleships and carriers. Reactivating the former would greatly impair maintenance support of the latter absent additional funds for expanding the facilities.

The battleship is a single-mission ship, with no viable anti-air or antisubmarine capability. Unlike the DD(X), which has a multiple mission capability and can operate independently, battleships require escort ships to defend them against those threats.

The battleship is particularly susceptible to targeting. Its very noisy propulsion plant, its sheer size and the additional escort ships would make it easy to locate. The DD(X), with its quiet propulsion system, stealth technology and ability to operate independently, would be much more difficult to target.

The battleship is the most heavily armored warship afloat. As such, it could survive hits from conventional guns along the armor belt positioned on the sides of the ship; but such armor is not optimally positioned for hits above that belt.

Reactivation of the Iowa Class battleships exceeded $2 billion in the 1980s. Reactivating two battleships today, updating radars and communications, procuring spare parts from firms no longer making them, and training crews would probably cost more than $2 billion per ship.

While modernization and conversion is possible, it would take time, involve great cost and leave unchanged certain aspects of these battleships — e.g., their inefficient oil-burning propulsion plants and the large number of personnel necessary to man their engineering departments.

With the global war on terrorism stretching our defense dollars thin, we must now, more than ever, maximize our return. Funds must be spent in a manner most capable of cost-effectively addressing the Navy’s future long-term needs. Putting them into a short-term naval gunfire support (NGFS) solution, such as battleships, is unresponsive to this requirement.

Thirty-five years ago, the Navy faced a similar situation. Tough decisions were needed on how best to spend defense dollars on short- and long-term needs while the Vietnam War drained limited funds. As head of the Navy at that time, my father decided to retire older ships early to fund new ones — opting to address the Navy’s long-term needs to counter a growing Soviet threat to U.S. control of the seas.

As U.S. control of the seas face future Chinese challenges, we must meet that long-term threat as well as the short-term need for NGFS. The DD(X) program will do exactly that.

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