Rebuilding accountability

Were security not already front and center in Iraq, then Gen. John Abizaid’s Aug. 3 utterance of the words “civil war ” certainly put it there.

Yet as conditions in Iraq worsen, it becomes increasingly important to keep sight of the broader picture. A principle tenet of counterinsurgency is that one wins hearts and minds by fattening bellies and wallets. If there is any hope of even passable success in the country, we must continue to fight on the economic as well as the security front, using “nonkinetic” tactics to improve financial welfare and to keep people invested in the system.

Unfortunately, many major reconstruction projects begun by the United States in Iraq risk failure, not because of violence or lack or funds but lax oversight, poor transparency and increasing corruption. Rebuilding Iraq is not just about more aid; it’s about smarter delivery and greater accountability. Yet, for all of the resources the United States has poured into large-scale reconstruction projects, too little attention has been paid to the nuts and bolts of oversight and project management.

The insurgents are well aware of the role economic rebuilding plays in regional security. From the start, they have struck at the economic heart of the country, crippling infrastructure and driving into exile the doctors, lawyers and business owners with the earning power to help their communities. More than 40 percent of Iraq’s professionals have fled the country since 2003 to wait out the conflict in places like Syria and Jordan. Many will never return.

Even though the insurgents continue disabling pipelines and disrupting electricity, reconstruction projects are making an important difference in Iraq. In three years, the United States has added more than 2,700 megawatts of capacity to the electrical grid — for a country that had a total capacity of 4,500 megawatts under Saddam — and similar projects are under way for waterworks, sewage and roads.

Reconstruction projects alone won’t cure the economic woes of Iraq, but they are an important precondition for a resurgence of the small businesses that drove the economy in the past and are needed in the future to pull the unemployed young men off of the street and out of the hands of the militias.

Unfortunately, from the start our reconstruction efforts have focused on working expeditiously rather than sustainably. The slew of no-bid and cost-plus contracts awarded at the end of major hostilities were justified on the grounds quick action was needed to prevent short-term instability from spiraling out of control. But our best stop-gap remedies haven’t helped arrest the insurgency’s momentum. Now is the time for more thorough accountability and greater skepticism toward those who would argue transparency is too costly and encumbering.

It may be too late to award contracts through competitive bidding, but it is not too late to ensure projects are completed as promised. This will only occur if the supervising agencies have the resources needed to do their jobs.

Recently, the U.S. Agency for International Development revealed it relied on just two officers to oversee its entire $1.4 billion portfolio of construction projects. It is no wonder an undertaking like the Basra children’s hospital could exceed its budget by $100 million and fall nine months behind schedule before auditors noticed something was wrong. Of the substantial portion of reconstruction funds diverted to security, a disproportionate amount has been cut from administrative overhead. These funds should be replenished with stricter guidelines for their use so agencies are not forced to conduct oversight on the cheap.

Not only does lack of oversight create delays and inflate costs during construction, it jeopardizes the future of already completed projects. There is no American regulatory body responsible for ensuring the schools, hospitals, power plants and water treatment facilities built are taken over by Iraqi ministries with organizational structures to manage them properly. In its recent quarterly report, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction strongly advocated devoting resources to the transition process.

Over the next several months, billions of dollars worth of construction projects will pass into the hands of the Iraqis, whether the Iraqis are ready or not. With corruption already beginning to carve large chunks out of the Iraqi gross domestic product, a proper plan for the transition is needed in place to ensure these projects are staffed and resourced properly instead of converted into fiefdoms for local officials and their appropriative in-laws. The United States has poured more money per capita into Iraq than it did through the Marshall Plan into Europe at the end of World War II. Yet administrative oversight remains chronically underfunded, threatening to turn good money into bad.

Lack of oversight is also one of the reasons international donors have withheld funds promised at the Madrid Conference in 2003. Unfortunately, that leaves the United States shouldering nearly the entire cost of reconstruction. After much cajoling on our part, the United Nations recently announced plans for a program called the International Compact for Iraq, a vehicle for coaxing skittish donors into the region by linking aid to political and economic reform in the Iraqi government. Not only can this be an opportunity for us to receive some much needed financial assistance with reconstruction, it may also offer a way to square our reconstruction efforts in Iraq with tying aid to good governance and transparent management. Whether by bullying, begging, or horsetrading, the United States should be prepared to pay the diplomatic cost to secure this assistance.

If our goal is to put Iraq on a course to stability and development, we must ensure reconstruction is properly completed. Greater accountability and improved transparency may be just a few pieces of the puzzle, but they are essential.

Andrew Kamons is former co-author of the Brookings Iraq Index and currently a Masters candidate in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

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