The media’s recent focus on earmarks as a parable of congressional abuse is understandable. Even a cub reporter can connect spurious dots. Earmarks are easily tracked to a “special interest” that probably contributed money at some point in the process to an unwitting lawmaker who asked for the funding. Given today’s standards, quid pro quos are easy to allege, and neither hapless congressmen nor lobbyists can “prove a negative.” So bingo spark and accelerant to propel another journalistic career, or at least a story du jour.
But the ascendancy of the Washington establishment, to borrow a phrase from Stanford political scientist Morris Fiorina — broadly defined as interest groups, regulators and Congress — is more complex and has deeper historical roots than the recent rise in earmarks alone. Understanding why “inside the Beltway” looks and operates the way it does today requires a trip down memory lane. Much of Washington’s contemporary complexion results from rules changes, policies and politics ushered in by liberal congressional Democrats during the 1970s.
Writing in the Wall Street Journal last week, Daniel Henninger accurately outlines how the rules governing funding campaigns and the federal government — the Federal Election Campaign Act and its subsequent amendments and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act — were authored by liberals in the 1970s. These two laws reflect Democratic ideology on matters such as government-imposed campaign spending limits and baseline budgeting, that still prove nettlesome to conservatives more than 30 years later.
He’s right, but there’s more. The look of Washington interest groups today also flows from liberal congressional activism beginning over three decades ago.
In 1970, House Democrats appointed the Hansen Commission (named after Rep. Julia B. Hansen of Washington state) and subsequently recommended a series of caucus rules changes, dramatically reducing the powers of senior lawmakers. Political scientist David W. Rhode, in his book “Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House,” writes that at least 16 new subcommittee chairman, mostly younger liberals, received their posts due to these new rules — armed with lethal weapons of lawmaking, hearings and investigation — ready to bludgeon businesses.
This trend accelerated after the 1974 elections when 75 new, largely liberal, House Democrats came to Washington. These “Watergate Babies” took advantage of changing Democratic Caucus rules, leap-frogging the seniority system previously dominated by more conservative Southerners, and setting the table for a feast of government activism.
Two other developments made liberal congressional activism even more lethal for business interests. First, the long purge of conservatives from the Democratic Party in Congress commenced and played out over the next 20 years. Second, Republicans’ shrinking numbers in the post-Watergate world limited their ability to oppose liberal initiatives. Following the 1974 elections, Republicans lost 48 seats in the House and five in the Senate. Republicans controlled well below 200 seats in the House (ranging between 143 and 192) for the next two decades.
These new congressional structural features dramatically influenced organized interests. As congressional activism grew, so did the institutionalization of the advocacy industry as we know it today.
One of the most striking developments was that business lobbying no longer relied exclusively on trade associations as their sole Washington representation. Prior to the 1970s, trade associations such as the American Medical Association or the National Association of Manufacturers represented most business interests. The proliferation of subcommittees and a more activist Congress changed that calculus. Particularized interests, threats and opportunities required more individualized attention.
As a graduate student in the early 1980s, studying the growth of PACs, I interviewed many corporate government-affairs representatives who confirmed this trend. Hearings, investigations and legislation aimed at specific interests created a new political world order. Starting a Washington office, forming a PAC and hiring lobbyists all had ripple effects. Participating in the Washington establishment became a competitive advantage; sitting it out, potentially costly. One corporate executive told me: “Once our CEO saw company X (their competitor) start a Washington office, we had to have one, too.”
Today’s Washington establishment has its lineage in the ideology of lawmakers more familiar with Woodstock and Watergate than spending restraint or the Internet. It’s unclear if Republicans can alter the swelling wave of Big Government fears and opportunities that caused the current system in Washington to take root. But it’s going to take a lot more than eliminating earmarks to turn this tide. And as history suggests, replacing the current majority with liberal lawmakers definitely won’t do the job.
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