Rebuilding in Iraq tops 4,000 projects

When and if the smoke ever clears in Iraq, Pentagon officials say the world finally will see a minor miracle.

“Most Americans don’t understand something equivalent to the Marshall Plan has been accomplished in Iraq,” said Dean G. Popps, principal assistant secretary of the Army for acquisitions, logistics and technology.

The Army is the program manager for $20 billion in U.S. taxpayer money that flowed to Iraq after the 2003 invasion to spur a building boom of more than 4,000 projects.

Amid constant deadly threats from bloodthirsty insurgents, and without a viable Iraqi private contracting sector, the Army Corps of Engineers has supervised the construction of electric grids, health care centers, schools, water and sewage treatment facilities, police stations, academies and border posts.

Not counting the deteriorating security situation, no facet of the Iraq war has received more negative press than the U.S.- and Iraqi-financed reconstruction. The Washington Times, along with other newspapers, has published a series of articles on setbacks and corruption. But, the Pentagon contends there is another storyline.

“It’s quite a heroic story maligned often by the news media,” Mr. Popps said during an interview in his E-Ring Pentagon office. A nearby multicolored map designates hundreds of projects started and completed, from Mosul to Basra.

Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, has issued a steady stream of reports revealing fraud and mismanagement. Perhaps his most damaging finding was that nearly a quarter of $37 billion in United Nations-secured oil money — not U.S. taxpayer funds — shipped to Iraq cannot be traced and was likely stolen.

But Mr. Bowen has said fraud involving U.S. money, while serious, is not widespread and that the huge majority of projects proceeded as required. And, a Bowen report to Congress last summer seemed to back up Mr. Popps’ message of progress.

“Although the story of Iraq reconstruction has been punctuated by shortfalls and deficiencies, the infrastructure overview provided [in] this quarterly report presents a picture of significant progress achieved through a substantial U.S. investment of time, talent and tax dollars in Iraq’s relief and reconstruction.”

Mr. Popps said it is first important to understand what the rebuilding team inherited. U.S. intelligence knew little about the actual state of Iraq’s energy infrastructure and social service network. When the Army Corps of Engineers got on the ground, there was shock:

• The three regional sewage treatments plants in greater Baghdad did not work; raw waste poured into the Tigris River and downstream through villages. Sadr City, the impoverished Shi’ite slum repressed by the ruling Sunni Ba’ath Party, lacked any sewage system. “Some slam the Americans because there is sewage in Sadr City,” said an incredulous Mr. Popps. “Please.”

• Few towns had a central supply of clean water.

• The electrical grid suffered under 1950s technology and disrepair. Saddam Hussein starved the rest of the country of power to give the capital of 6 million about 20 hours a day.

• The country lacked any primary health care facilities; hospitals and schools were run down and lacked supplies. New hospitals had not been built in 20 years. More than half the public health centers remained closed. Of 13,000 schools, more than 10,000 needed significant renovations.

The Pentagon in 2003 summoned American firms to get reconstruction started in the absence of Iraqi ministries that could supervise and a private sector that was in shambles under Saddam’s totalitarian rule.

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