Afghan war has lessons for U.S. pilots in Iraq

The U.S. military command in Iraq has confirmed that the Sea Knight helicopter that crashed last week was shot down by a missile. The growing losses of American helicopters in Iraq indicate that insurgents have obtained shoulder-launched portable missiles and improved their anti-aircraft tactics.

Development of anti-helicopter warfare capability is the logical step for insurgents after their improvised explosive devices turned Iraq’s roads into killing zones for American convoys and patrols. U.S. troops now depend heavily on helicopters for transportation, supply and support.

Soviet pilots faced the same challenge in Afghanistan. Having served 4 years in Afghanistan as a military linguist and area specialist, I had to fly many helicopter assault missions with the Spetsnaz special forces, and with Soviet and Afghan government troops.

I witnessed how mujahedeen fighters developed their anti-aircraft tactics, which allowed them to bring down 118 airplanes and 333 helicopters by the end of the conflict in 1989.

The mujahedeen’s anti-aircraft tactics and Soviet countermeasures could provide lessons to help reduce losses and save American lives in Iraq.

Stinger’s sting

During the first years of the Afghanistan war, the Soviet air force enjoyed unchallenged dominance of the skies. The main tactic of the mujahedeen was “dive and hide,” using caves to survive Soviet air strikes. Their anti-aircraft weapons consisted of Soviet-, Chinese- and Egyptian-made machine guns and a limited number of older Soviet- and Egyptian-made surface-to-air missiles.

All this changed with the introduction of Stinger missiles in 1986. The mujahedeen used Stingers to bring down Soviet planes and helicopters, and Soviet air losses climbed rapidly.

The mujahedeen developed sophisticated tactics for engaging Soviet aircraft and helicopters.

Teams usually consisted of one or two missile operators with two to four missiles and 10 to 15 fighters to protect the operators and capture or kill downed Soviet pilots.

Under cover of darkness, such teams approached an air base, took cover using terrain features or camouflage nets, and waited for aircraft or helicopters to take off or land. After firing their missiles, they would disappear into a green vegetation zone, foothills or a village.

Evidence links Iran with weapons supplies to insurgents in Iraq. Portable shoulder-fired missiles would be a logical addition to the supply list because of the death toll and press coverage for every helicopter downed.

Surface-to-air missiles stolen from loosely controlled stockpiles can bring a good price on the black market. During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, weapons supplied by the United States to Afghan fighters found their way to black markets in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province.

The first Stinger missiles were captured by a Soviet special forces team south of Kandahar. Agents from KHAD, the Afghan communist government’s counterpart to the KGB, later bought “surplus” Stingers at a well-known weapons market in Helmand province.

During the war in Chechnya, multiple Russian helicopters were brought down by SA-18 GRAU and SA-16 Gimlet missiles stolen from Russian military units and sold to Chechen separatists.

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