The ministers and Musharraf

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Signs abound that the terms of the U.S.-Pakistani alliance have changed, and that these changes are likely to impede the Bush administration's prosecution of the war on terror. The unfortunate question now seems to be how extensively this relationship often credited as central to the effort will deteriorate. Reports are emerging that U.S. military drones have stepped up raids to accomplish the last few strikes before what some fear to be the possible end of the Pervez Musharraf era. Coupled with the news that Pakistan may now favor a negotiated settlement with Taliban fighters, some very unfavorable near-term circumstances seem to be taking shape. The loss of even the difficult and uncertain alliance of Mr. Musharraf's Pakistan, which kept this nuclear-armed country home to some of the world's most dangerous radical Islamists within the U.S. orbit on some antiterror goals but not others, is not something the United States can easily afford.

First, the new coalition government sworn into office over the last seven days seems likely to constrain President Pervez Musharraf's options severely, if not maneuver for his complete ouster. Its members are all either onetime political casualties of Mr. Musharraf or people whose support base lies far outside his orbit. Key in this government is Yousaf Raza Gillani. The new prime minister, of the Pakistan People's Party, spent nearly five years in jail after his conviction by a Musharraf-aligned court on what many regard as politically motivated charges. He seems an unlikely friend to Mr. Musharraf. Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, sworn in by Mr. Musharraf Monday, held the same position under former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif until Mr. Musharraf's 1999 coup. He, too, was imprisoned, subsequent to the coup, for two years. The 52-year-old Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi served as finance minister for the state of Punjab from 1990-93, hails from a prominent landed family and seems, like his fellow ministers, to owe Mr. Musharraf nothing while also facing good reason to oppose him.

Add reports of a shakeup in the military and it looks as though the former general is increasingly isolated. Insofar as U.S. policy toward Pakistan hinges on Mr. Musharraf — and it surely has in the recent past — this practically guarantees a host of new circumstances.

None of which should be read to suggest that the coalition government elected in February is one with which the United States cannot cooperate. In reality, it must. This is the face of democratic Pakistan after the February elections. Strategic significance matters in its own right, but that should not excuse entirely the "freedom agenda" in this case. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, executor of backroom negotiations in recent weeks, is already trying to make success where the prospects are grim. The coming months will test his assurances that the U.S.-Pakistan alliance will be able to continue on what we already regard as less-than-ideal terms, which may well worsen soon.