How can the U.S. improve its human intelligence?

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By William H. Webster

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

One of the most devastating elements of a terrorist attack is surprise, coming at a time and place and by means of an adversary's choosing. The two most costly of such attacks in my lifetime occurred on Sunday morning, Dec. 7, 1941, and on Tuesday morning, Sept. 11, 2001, sixty years apart.

The "day of infamy" attack on our fleet resting in Pearl Harbor virtually destroyed our ability to make an immediate response and opened the Pacific to a prolonged period of Japanese military expansion. Did we know it was coming? When? Where? And how? It depends upon one's definition of "we." We had broken the Japanese code. We knew some of the details of their plans. The problem lay in the analysis of the information and the inadequate communication of the threat to our forces. We failed.

The 9/11 attack utilized domestic commercial aircraft with bulk fuel loads and hijacked passengers to attack three vulnerable targets within minutes of each other. (A fourth target survived attack because the passengers took action to prevent the terrorists from achieving their goal, at the cost of passengers' own lives.) Did we know it was coming? We knew some of what was in the wind, but not when or where and by what means and targets. The information was not shared between intelligence agencies. It was ultimately called "a failure of imagination."

The Central Intelligence Agency was established after World War II with a mission to prevent another Pearl Harbor surprise in the future. The director of the CIA was also director of Central Intelligence (DCI), with a somewhat loose responsibility to coordinate the activities of some 15 member organizations of the Intelligence Community. In time, the DCI established a counterterrorist center in order to coordinate our counterterrorist efforts.

In 1980, while I was director of the FBI, we were experiencing approximately 100 terrorist incidents per year. These were domestically inspired, smaller but lethal. I made terrorism one of our four top priorities, along with organized crime, white-collar crime and foreign counterintelligence. We realized that reducing these numbers meant getting there before the bomb went off. This clearly called for improved intelligence, penetration of violent organizations, undercover initiatives and better coordination with the other members of the intelligence community, including a well-trained hostage rescue team and local swat teams. This effort resulted in reducing the number of terrorist incidents from 100 to six in 1987, the year I moved to CIA.

As we move forward in the 21st century, we must close the gaps in our coverage of foreign states, illegal enemy combatants and other organizations using terrorist techniques.

What are these gaps?

(1) Language. Frederick P. Hitz, former inspector general of the CIA, noted in his recent book that the Iraq Study Group found in 2006 that there were only six fluent Arabic speakers in our embassy in Iraq at the time of their visit. In 2003, the figure for Arabic studies majors in the United States was 22. We cannot train officers and agents at this rate to collect the information we need much less understand the cultural and political differences that divide us from the Arab world.

(2) National Counterterrorist Center. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the NCTC on a permanent basis, utilizing personnel from across the Intelligence Community. The original CTC created in 1986 was broadened to be seen as truly multidisciplinary in leadership and staffing and under the director of National Intelligence. It needs the support of and must be fully funded by Congress.

(3) Expansion of human intelligence (Humint). These on-the-ground sources are the most reliable means of ascertaining the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. Whenever the threat seems lessened these sources are the first to go and not be replaced. These sources are vital to our security, they cannot be put on ice and immediately called up and put in place to meet each new threat, whether officially assigned or as nonofficial cover agents (NOCs). This takes time, and the time to do it is now.

(4) Complete the FBI's reorganization of its data gathering and data mining electronic capability. Past efforts have failed to transform this extremely valuable resource into a system that can supply needed intelligence to CIA and other key agencies. "Need to share" is just as important as "need to know." The cost is high, but well worth it.

(5) Pre-emptive and preventive intelligence. The intelligence gathered by modern digital technology on a rapid basis should be made available to all personnel charged with spotting suspected terrorists at various points of entry as will those on the watch lists seeking to fly on commercial aircraft. Any useful intelligence gathered abroad must be promptly conveyed to security officers looking for suspected individuals and cargo so that the prompt and preventive policy can be more effective.

(6) Improve National Estimates. The longer-view estimates have often been neglected by consumers at the White House and elsewhere in favor of the "current intelligence" that seems to be more readily actionable. The NIEs have real, though less apparent value, in spotting trends and conditions that could result in hostile action against the United States and should be elevated in quality and presentation.

(7) Retention of objectivity. We may expect in a troubled world during this century that our leaders may want to cherry-pick the intelligence to support a previously determined program for action. Intelligence officers must not only be seen to be objective; they must protect the work product from distortion by the consumers that can only undermine its credibility. This can be a tough assignment, but it must be done.

(8) Science and technology. The efforts of our adversaries to steal our technology will not cease. We must carefully protect our assets and be alert, from all sources, to any plans or efforts to engage in technology transfer.

Our satellites project important imagery and signals intelligence that expand our understanding of potentially hostile activities and should be enhanced wherever possible. They do not, however, replace the need for on-the-ground intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. A well-placed human source can be of critical importance in explicating the purpose of such activities detected by our electronic "eyes and ears."

Similarly, human intelligence can also be an important factor in helping our electronic tools focus upon unusual plans or activities on the ground. Each is important in early detection and analysis. Together, they can make an important contribution to the safety of our nation by avoiding surprise and miscalculation of the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries and are thus indispensable to our policy-makers in reaching sound decisions in the best interest of our country. Public source information must also be factored in. But if we want to avoid surprises like Pearl Harbor and 9/11 we must have access to closely guarded secrets. Humint cannot be an afterthought. It must be developed in advance and the intelligence community must be afforded the time and funding to make sure it is in place when it is needed.

William H. Webster is the chairman of the Homeland Security Advisory Council and a former director of the CIA and the FBI.