OPINION:
At first glance, the latest U.S.-North Korean agreement may appear to be a workable compromise because Pyongyang agreed to the return of nuclear inspectors in exchange for removal from the U.S. terrorism list. Look closely, however, and it becomes apparent that the agreement is riddled with ambiguities that North Korea can exploit to continue nuclear-weapons production and research. The agreement follows another round of cheating and threats from Pyongyang. In the weeks leading up to announcement of the agreement, North Korea kicked out international weapons inspectors, declared its intention to reopen its Yongbyon nuclear facility and conducted several missile tests.
These tactics are virtually certain to continue in the future, because the government of Kim Jong il has successfully employed them thus far in the six-party talks on North Korean disarmament. (The other parties are the United States, South Korea, Russia, China and Japan.) For example, the crux of the most recent impasse in negotiations was Pyongyang’s insistence that its declaration of its nuclear activities in June was sufficient to get it taken off the terror list and that it did not have to worry about whether its assertions could be verified. This is simply false. For more than three years, American officials have emphasized to North Korea that verification was an essential component of any agreement. But when push came to shove, North Korea sought to renege, and other nations participating in the talks (with the notable exception of Japan) suggested that Washington should try to work something out with North Korea. And so the Bush administration acquiesced.
The administration and its supporters suggest that as a result of their work, America’s next president will inherit a situation in which U.S. and international experts will be on the ground learning North Korea’s nuclear secrets and disabling its weapons facilities. They could be deluding themselves because of the loopholes in the deal. For example, access to undeclared sites is possible only with mutual consent, effectively giving Pyongyang a veto over U.S. efforts to find covert nuclear sites. It is unclear whether North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program would be covered by the agreement and what information Pyongyang would be required to provide its nuclear-proliferation activities with Syria. This is particularly important in the wake of the Sept. 6, 2007, Israeli air strike that destroyed what is believed to be a nearly completed nuclear-weapons facility in Syria. But even if an agreement is reached, who is to say that six months from now, Pyongyang won’t trigger some new crisis by demanding some new political or financial concessions - and threatening to end its participation in the talks if its demands are not meant?
This kind of agreement will likely embolden rogue-state proliferators like Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been sent an unmistakable and disturbing message: Once you cheat successfully and produce atomic bombs, you no longer have to worry about what Washington thinks. When push comes to shove, the United States and other world powers will always look for a way to placate you in order to prevent the collapse of diplomacy. Meanwhile, Libyan strongman Moammar Gadhafi is probably wondering why the remnants of his former nuclear-weapons program are sitting in Oak Ridge, Tenn., after he agreed five years ago to relinquish it.
But in the short term, the country most troubled by the appeasement of North Korea is probably Japan, which believes the verification provisions are inadequate and that Washington has given short shrift to its concerns about the fate of its citizens kidnapped by North Korea.
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