In January alone, FIFA banned 41 players in South Korea from soccer for life due to match-fixing. That follows 51 worldwide bans last year _ 22 of them for life _ on players, officials and referees from Croatia, Finland, Guatemala, Italy, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Korea and Turkey.
FIFA bans include some elite figures in the sport. Antonio Conte, coach of the Italian club Juventus _ a team whose winning tradition rivals that of baseball’s New York Yankees _ returned in December after a four-month ban for failing to report match-fixing.
Forrest’s report said that after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S., the war on terror relegated the fight against organized crime to a distinct second place, and that allowed gangs “to invest in new areas of the economy with relative impunity for nearly 10 years.”
Eaton attributes the surge in match-fixing to an exponential rise in online gambling _ “at least 500 percent, and likely far more” _ in the last decade.
Criminals have targeted every level of the game: the World Cup, regional tournaments such as the Champions League, high-powered divisions like England’s Premier League and Italy’s Serie A, “friendly” exhibition contests between national teams, all the way down to semipro games in the soccer wilderness.
Criminals are always trying to find the sweet spot between how poorly the players are paid and how much bettors want to wager on a game, Forrest said. That’s why fixers don’t try too hard to target the Super Bowl, he says, because “the bribes would be so high to convince the athletes to join.”
World Cup and European qualifiers that face uneven matchups are key targets because one team may “have no chance of getting into the tournament,” Forrest said in an interview.
The same scenario applies to early rounds of major tournaments or late-season national leagues, where one team is desperately trying to either win a trophy or avoid being sent down to a lower league. Those situations propel teams upward into a whole new level of revenue or send them tumbling off a financial cliff.
Match-fixing has also branched out from traditional hotbeds of corruption _ Asia and the Balkans _ to places like Canada, Finland and Norway, which rank among the least corrupt nations in the world. Until recently, no one _ including sports regulators _ thought to look for corruption in lower-level leagues. Still, given the vast amount of soccer betting, there’s plenty of money to be made.
“It’s liquidity of the markets,” Forrest said. “You can make serious money only if you can put on (bet) serious money. In most sports, the bet you can make is too small.”
Goalkeeper Richard Kingson of Ghana says he was offered _ but declined _ $300,000 to lose a game to the Czech Republic at the 2006 World Cup in Germany.
But prices have gone up. Italy’s Calciopoli investigation found it cost up to $516,000 to fix a match in the top league of Serie A; $155,000 for a fix in the second division and $64,500 for a third-division fixed match.
In Croatia, court documents show that first-league games in 2010 could be fixed for as little as $25,600.
There is also a shift in the traditional match-fixing scenario in which players are paid to lose or referees are paid to make sure one team wins. With the rise of online spot betting _ wagers made during the game _ criminal gangs can predetermine not only the outcome of the match but also make money on bets like how many goals are scored, when they are scored, or who will take a penalty kick.
These live bets can “be particularly advantageous for criminals,” according to Forrest’s report, because they increase the number of wagers placed on the same fixed game.