ORMAN/FOX: What next for missile defense?

OPINION:

COMMENTARY:

Missile defense is once again a topic of interest. Supporters of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) are concerned that the new Obama administration might stop the proposed deployment of the so-called third site in Eastern Europe, thus appearing to cave in to Russian threats of reprisals. There is also concern that planned expenditure on development of the current capabilities might be reduced or even eliminated.

In considering the future it is important not to forget the past. The subject of BMD first became an issue of worldwide discussion in 1983 when President Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This was a bold attempt to change the mutual assured destruction policy that had dominated the Cold War. Even though there was considerable misunderstanding about what was achievable with a BMD system, the mere introduction of the subject led to wild speculation. Since then the topic has excited worldwide interest every few years as new situations have arisen.

President George Bush entered the White House in 2000 with the promise to progress development with the intention of deploying a BMD before he left office. True to his word, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, enabling plans to progress for the deployment of a BMD. Despite fears of a significant adverse reaction to withdrawal from this treaty between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, criticism was minimal.

The first interceptor missile of the ground-based missile defense system was placed in a silo in Fort Greely, Alaska, in July 2004. Further missiles have been added there since, and others at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The sites include radars and complex battle management facilities to enable targets to be identified, tracked and intercepted.

The sites in Alaska and on the West Coast are clearly designed to protect America against missile attacks from limited raids that might be launched from hostile nations or from terrorist groups who might acquire a few missiles. They are clearly unable to deal with thousands of missiles that Russia still possesses.

American policy has been to bring friends and allies under the umbrella of a BMD. This is important because many allies still rely for their security on American extended nuclear deterrence, an assurance that has been operative for decades. By extending missile defense to these allies, the likelihood of the need for a nuclear response to an attack on any of them is reduced.

To meet these broad requirements the American objectives for BMD remain the ability to intercept missiles of all ranges at all stages of their flight. Realistically, these objectives could only be achieved with the utilization of space-based interceptors, a concept too hot politically to pursue at this time. Recognition of this limitation led to the desire to place ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe to provide a partial solution for the protection of European allies. The agreements made with Poland and the Czech Republic led to the voicing of strong Russian objections to this activity, even threatening to deploy new missiles close to the Polish border. This exchange once again brought the topic of BMD to worldwide attention.

Several recent articles have encouraged the incoming Obama administration to support the BMD activities and European agreements. They claim the system is capable of protecting against limited raids. This may be correct, but at this stage it is conjecture rather than demonstrated fact. The components that comprise a missile defense system have been proven to work individually. The local area defense systems Patriot PAC 3, and the Navy’s Aegis have both been extensively and successfully tested as full systems. Unfortunately the ground-based BMD that is currently deployed in Alaska and at Vandenberg, and is planned for deployment in Eastern Europe, has not been similarly proven.

Following the political decision to deploy a capability in Alaska, there has been a reluctance to subject it to demanding tests to ascertain its full capability. It has not yet been declared operational. While it might not be considered unusual for such a complex system to still be under the control of a contractor rather than the military operators after four years in the field, what is unusual is that no intercept test firings have been conducted for almost two years.

A further test was undertaken on Dec. 6, in which decoys that had been added to the target failed to deploy, reducing the quality of the trial. Even had it been fully successful, it would not have made up for the lack of serious testing over such a long period. Until the current capabilities of this system have been identified, it is difficult to make balanced improvements. Far too much time has been wasted.

These comments do not come from opponents of BMD. The plea for more realistic testing comes from strong supporters of missile defense who have been engaged in the ballistic missile/anti-ballistic missile activity for over 30 years.

We remain strongly supportive of the need to enhance the BMD capabilities and to deploy such systems overseas, but plead with the new administration to ensure we have a technologically proven BMD rather than a politically driven one. We have to hope that the new administration will take a balanced view of the situation. Ignoring both those who claim we already have an effective system and those who counter-claim it is useless. We need to build upon the inherited foundation and thus ensure we enhance our own security and that of our allies.

Stanley Orman is a former undersecretary of state in the United Kingdom. Eugene Fox is a retired U.S. Army major general.