Communications are vital

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

- Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”

Clearly, no one at the House Defense Appropriations subcommittee has read Sun Tzu. How else to explain the panel’s proposed drastic cuts in the Department of Defense’s budget for Information Operations - aka IO?

“Loose lips sink ships” is perhaps the best known “information operation,” successfully deployed during World War II to effectively communicate the need to stay mum.

Today’s war against radical extremism requires similarly artful, nuanced, Tzu-like communications efforts - what is called Strategic Communications (StratCom), which Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke considers the sine qua non of victory, of which IO is a critical component.

StratCom and IO are all about winning what Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, head of the American-led NATO forces in Afghanistan, calls “the important battle of perception” so essential to retaining “the continued support of the Afghan population” he dubs the “operational center of gravity.” Gen. McChrystal defined the role of communications and information in great detail in his “Initial Assessment.”

Given IO’s importance, the House panel’s attempted raid is confounding, and brings to mind Inspector Jacques Clouseau - that stumblebum French Surete police inspector of “Pink Panther” fame, who conducts investigations gone seriously awry given his own incompetence.

The panel slashed half a billion from the Pentagon’s request for IO programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, while holding the remaining $488,000 in abeyance until the department can justify what it’s doing with the money - going back to 2005. (Senate Appropriations later cut only $58.8 million.) This, though U.S. Military combat commanders, from Gen. David H. Petraeus on down, stress IO programs were a key factor in winning popular support in Iraq.

While the Pentagon admits $626.6 million would be sufficient for IO in 2010, given increasing coordination of the evolving role of Strategic Communications in the “indirect warfare” we faced in Iraq, and now face in Afghanistan, the proposed cuts and freeze go beyond the pale.

Clearly, the panel is clueless regarding the new war we’re fighting, in which the “confidence and trust” of the population is built more through offense, especially carefully deployed StratCom, than standard military operations.

As Gen. McChrystal writes, “Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population.”

It’s the “Three Cups of Tea” approach of Greg Mortenson, who has made his life’s work building schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which top brass like Adm. Eric Olson, head of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), find compelling. The admiral has hosted Mr. Mortenson twice at SOCOM Headquarters.

As for measuring its impact, let’s just say it scores high on the common-sense scale - something Madison Avenue has long recognized, reaping billions for its insights.

All this notwithstanding, the House panel expressed concern over “not only the significant amount of [IO] funding … but, more importantly, about the Department’s assumption of this mission … [noting] much of what is being produced appears to be United States Military, and more alarmingly, non-military propaganda, public relations, and behavioral modification messaging.”

Exacerbating this alleged transgression, the panel reports, are “supposed efforts to minimize target audience knowledge of United States Government sponsorship of certain production materials.”

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