Runaway from runoff?

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By Michael O'Hanlon

Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah's decision to withdraw from Saturday's presidential runoff is a setback for Afghan democracy. But it also is a major mistake by him, and should not be allowed to interfere with our broader efforts to help Afghanistan get on its feet politically and militarily.

The country has plenty of problems; Mr. Abdullah chose the wrong ones over which to fall on his sword. And incumbent President Hamid Karzai has plenty of problems too - but the fact that he will now win a second term by default is not among his biggest.

Mr. Abdullah's decision smacks more of a concession than a principled stand. It feels more like, aware of the unlikelihood that he could come close to Mr. Karzai in the voting, he preferred to make a spectacle of the situation and taint Mr. Karzai's win rather than simply lose fair and square.

Mr. Abdullah's complaint, of course, is that some members of one of Afghanistan's independent election boards are too friendly with Mr. Karzai, and thus not trustworthy as arbiters of the election outcome.

That board, known as the Independent Election Commission, seemed prepared to whitewash the results of the Aug. 20 vote for Mr. Karzai's benefit and hand him a first-round win. Mr. Abdullah also objects to the decision to open several hundred polling stations in the south where fraud was at its worst on Aug. 20.

On the merits of the argument, he may have at least a partial point on both of these specific issues. But the other election board, the Election Complaints Commission, is reputable - and the overall system seems to have worked this fall.

It wasn't pretty, to be sure. But aided by the international community, Afghanistan's election boards ultimately returned some rigor and legitimacy to the first round of the presidential race. They found evidence of fraud and stuffing of ballot boxes - and threw out lots of votes as a result. Their work led to the situation where the Saturday runoff was needed; Mr. Karzai's initial tally of votes of around 55 percent to 60 percent ultimately was reduced to 48 percent. Since the latter figure was less than 50 percent, a two-man showdown was required by the Afghan constitution.

This is not a defense of Mr. Karzai, of course. None of this should have happened. Mr. Karzai put up with too many abuses by his cronies and partisans throughout the process. Before the elections, state-run media covered him and his campaign far more than it covered other candidates.

On election day, many ballot boxes were in fact stuffed. The excuses that Mr. Karzai did not know what was happening, or that such cheating was semi-justified because it compensated for low turnout by Pashtun voters (mostly friendly to Mr. Karzai) in areas of the country where the insurgency is strongest, do not wash. Mr. Karzai was finally persuaded to accept that reality, due to a great deal of work by his fellow Afghans, key Americans and others.

Therefore, despite it all, the Afghan election process has been a glass more than half-full. And even though the Saturday runoff would have had some of the same problems as the Aug. 20 round, and would have faced bad weather in places, it would have likely been fairly credible.

Domestic and international scrutiny would have continued. Since Mr. Karzai would likely have won around 60 percent of the vote in the runoff, relatively minor to modest problems wouldn't have mattered so much. And the bad weather in the north and center of the country, where Mr. Abdullah is strongest, would not have suppressed turnout among his supporters nearly as much as the insurgency would continue to suppress turnout among generally pro-Karzai Pashtuns in the south and east where the violence is greatest.

Mr. Karzai must face other problems now, though. The crisis of legitimacy he faces among his fellow Afghans remains, due to poor governance more than electoral fraud.

Assuming he is now awarded a second term, Mr. Karzai will have to re-earn that trust and legitimacy from his fellow citizens - or the insurgency will continue to worsen.

Mr. Karzai needs to indulge in less favoritism toward his friends, family, and fellow Durrani tribesman. He must reduce graft and corruption, fire a few of the worst from his national and regional governments, and spread the benefits of the country's wealth and international aid resources more evenly.

The rival Ghilzai tribal confederation, the core of the Taliban, and others must benefit more from Mr. Karzai's young administration. This is the postelection agenda before us.

Mr. Abdullah's decision is a distraction from that agenda, but it should not be allowed to capture our attention for long.

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.