OPINION:
Long a fragile state, Yemen teeters on the precipice of collapse. Ongoing bloody skirmishes between government troops and opposition tribes portend another civil war. The security implications - for the United States, the region and the world - are grave. Yemen sits astride a major energy transit chokepoint just opposite the already lawless Somalia, while al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula infests its hinterlands. Although its weakness and threats have long been known, until recently we have done little to help strengthen Yemen. Now it might be too late.
Yemen is just one example of the need for - and the dangers of lacking - a comprehensive strategy to stabilize preventably fragile states. Pakistan, nuclear-armed and a sanctuary for extremist militants, and Nigeria, oil-rich but deeply divided, are others. To meet the security threats posed by fragile states with ungoverned spaces, weak government institutions and opportunity-deprived societies, the United States must both maintain the force to subdue hostile regimes and improve its ability to help weaker, cooperative nations become more stable and constructive partners.
With two long wars still under way and our nation still recovering from a recession, this is a difficult time politically to begin a discussion about the need for long-term foreign engagement. Indeed, most congressional legislators, with notable exceptions such as Sens. John McCain and Joe Lieberman, are reluctant to address how to deal proactively with fragile states, much less fund such a strategy. But it is precisely because of current concerns about the budget that it is essential to deal with this issue. Because American interests will be threatened by fragile or failed states, we can lessen future threats and costs in blood and treasure by investing in the strategy and capabilities needed to stabilize such states.
A recently released report on a study we co-chaired for the Bipartisan Policy Center articulates five main principles that should guide our efforts to more effectively stabilize fragile states.
First, stabilization efforts should focus on identifying and lending assistance only to those states that are on the brink of failure, that pose a serious potential threat to U.S. security. Yemen, Pakistan and Nigeria fit the bill; the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Zimbabwe might be even worse off but are less relevant to U.S. strategic interests.
Second, the United States cannot afford to wait until the strategic dangers of state failure materialize. According to Government Accountability Office figures, relying on the military for post-conflict intervention and reconstruction can be eight times more costly and less effective than supporting a preventative civilian-led response.
Third, security and good governance are mutually reinforcing dynamics. The few fragile states where stabilization efforts have proved successful, such as Colombia and Indonesia, did not simply win military victories over insurgents and terrorists. They matched security gains with measures to provide justice, improve government accountability and give citizens a voice. Public confidence in the fairness and accessibility of the political system - what we term “civic resilience” - is key to longer-term stability. Our strategies and practices must reflect this.
Fourth, we lack the institutional capacity to undertake preventive, civilian-led stabilization missions. The post-World War II division of labor between the Defense and State departments enabled the U.S. diplomatic corps to evolve into a highly professional civil service that excels at representing America’s interests abroad. But because the military dominated foreign engagements during the Cold War, the majority of operational capacity, logistical expertise and funds for large-scale missions reside with it. Instead of expending more money, we should cure these institutional gaps by more smartly balancing the division of labor and funds between Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon.
Finally, stabilization must be approached with humility and determination. The United States is often quick to react forcefully and generously in response to conflicts abroad, but its attention frequently comes too late or fades too quickly. We gave arms to support Afghans’ battle against the Soviet invasion of the 1980s, but once the war ended, we failed to invest in developing the schools and government institutions to help rebuild that country. Ten years later, we had to return. Rather than intense bursts of aid at the darkest hour, fragile states require early engagement, measured assistance and a sustained commitment. We require determined local partners, such as former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe.
By seeking to prevent state failure rather than merely reacting to it; by helping weak countries build their own capacities to provide security, governance and jobs; and by more smartly and judiciously using both our civilian and our military assets, we can limit the threats our nation will face from lawless regions of the world while limiting the costs we pay. Changing our foreign policy and apparatus to adopt these priorities will require bold leadership and reasoned consensus, but it is imperative we do so before another strategically important fragile state implodes.
Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky was undersecretary of state for democracy and global affairs under President George W. Bush. Retired Navy Adm. Gregory Johnson served as commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe. Together they co-chaired the 2011 Bipartisan Policy Center report “A Stitch in Time: Stabilizing Fragile States.”
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