The September 11 report

Given the partisan battles that plagued the September 11 commission earlier this year, it comes as something of a pleasant surprise that the report issued yesterday was unanimous, and that it is a useful starting point for a much-needed debate over ways to reform U.S. intelligence operations.

We’re not prepared to weigh in on many of these specific ideas right now, before a robust political debate on the merits. But it makes sense to begin discussions of these topics. Starting next January, intelligence reform should be a top priority for the new Congress and the executive branch. Some of the changes proposed by the commission can be implemented by executive order.

Although during the commission’s public sessions this spring, some of the commissioners, in particular Richard Ben-Veniste, seemed intent on scoring political points at the expense of the current administration, such partisan rancor was absent from the report issued yesterday. In the end, the commission was remarkably successful in minimizing the political partisanship inherent in much of official Washington.

The report issued yesterday strongly suggests that collaboration between Iran and Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization has occurred for more than a decade and was more extensive than previously thought. Most intriguing is the panel’s conclusion that between eight and 10 of the 14 Saudi “muscle” hijackers (in other words, the terrorists charged with subduing the passengers on the doomed September 11 planes) traveled into or out of Iran in late 2000 and early 2001.

There is “strong evidence,” the commission says, “that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members in and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers.” At least several of these hijackers transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan before September 11, taking advantage of Tehran’s practice of not stamping Saudi passports. While there is no evidence to date that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for the September 11 attacks, the commission quite properly urges further investigation of the matter by Washington.

On the question of Iraq and al Qaeda, the final report is a marked improvement over last month’s commission staff report, which stated that there had been “no collaborative relationship” between the two. After the commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton defended Vice President Dick Cheney against his media critics, and respected journalists like Stephen Hayes of the Weekly Standard pointed out substantive flaws, the panel made an important change in the wording — concluding in yesterday’s report that there was “no collaborative operational relationship” — a finding that has the advantage of being accurate without whitewashing the fact that Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda sometimes worked together and were bitter enemies of the United States.