A friend, widely experienced in the Middle East, called the other day with a loaded question. Suppose, he asked, Osama bin Laden’s reasons and strategy for confronting the United States were fully rational and that he was not a crazed fanatic as many assume? After all, he helped drive the Soviets from Afghanistan, ultimately leading to the great collapse.
And further, suppose the case put forth by the White House and uncritically endorsed by both sides of the aisle in Congress, that bin Laden was simply out to destroy America and all that it stood for because of hatred of our values, society and embrace of liberty and freedom was as flawed as the conclusion Saddam Hussein possessed WMD. Would that revelation change our policies and induce us to deal with al Qaeda and the threat of radical Islam differently?
Wow. Imagine telling that to President Bush and his team. At best, the reaction would be disbelief and disparagement. September 11 and suicide bombers bent on martyrdom are about as far from rational as one can get. Bin Laden is clearly a nihilist using terror and destruction as the means to impose a radical form of fundamentalism on Muslim society. Women and children, as well as innocent civilians, are acceptable targets. Look at Israel, the poster child for how Islamist terrorists operate, they would add.
In response, my friend would patiently point out that careful review of bin Laden’s pronouncements and statements reveal a remarkably consistent message. Bin Laden has detailed a list of grievances against the United States. These reflect attitudes widely accepted throughout the Arab and Muslim world as to why American policy is disliked and opposed even by so-called moderates. From them arise major demands, including: the end of U.S. aid to Israel; the elimination of the Jewish state and replacement with an Islamic Palestinian one; withdrawal of Western forces from Muslim territory; restoration of Muslim control over energy; replacement of U.S. protected Muslim regimes that do not govern according to Islam; and the end of U.S. support in the oppression of Muslims by Russian, Chinese, Indian and other governments.
My friend went on to acknowledge that these demands were categorically unacceptable to any American government. But, in terms of the nature of each grievance, they were no greater or lesser, say, than those our forefathers levied against England igniting the revolution. However I cautioned him, to say that publicly would evoke a firestorm from all directions by citizens deeply offended by any comparison with al Qaeda even though King George branded American rebels as terrorists.
Two questions raised in this discourse are particularly interesting. First, in the toxic and partisan-charged atmosphere that shrouds Washington, can the notion of a rational bin Laden even be suggested and seriously discussed or would it be laughed out of town? Second, if this case could be made, what if anything does that mean for American policy?
The first question is unanswerable until someone has the courage or recklessness to launch this idea. As for the second, there are some possibilities that deserve further exploration. If these grievances are genuine foundations for bin Laden’s strategy and planning, then surely we would be well advised to determine where we could blunt or reduce their impact on the Muslim world that may empathize but not join with al Qaeda in their jihad. Better understanding could also accelerate attempts to bring a lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a critically urgent step in containing and destroying al Qaeda by removing one of its principal attractions for legitimacy. And there is another immediate benefit.
We tend to lump terrorists into the same compartment in which the only remedies are bullets, bombs or incarceration. In other words, these terrorists are impervious to anything other than brute force.
But if there is a measure of rationality present, then perhaps that insight can be applied to the dozen or dozen-and-a-half Sunni terrorist organizations operating in Iraq today. Many are not jihadists and are fearful or resentful of a Shia-controlled state or reflect tribal and other rivalries. Hence, negotiating with some or many of these “terrorist” subgroups and adjudicating their grievances, if possible, might dent and derail the insurgency and expedite the transition to a pluralistic and law-abiding society.
The larger question of whether bin Laden might have reason to seek some form of dialogue or even negotiation with the West as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger held with China and with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front during that war is premature even to suggest. However, if my friend is correct, then perhaps someone should start thinking about that possibility no matter how distant and reckless it may look today.
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