Phony war no more

Is the latest escalation in violence in Iraq merely a “spike,” as the White House and the Pentagon argue? Or, is this upsurge in fighting indicative of the insurgency spreading to the majority Shia population with the specter of civil war a looming prospect? Or, do the past two weeks raise even more daunting surprises and challenges both for the coalition and Iraqis dedicated to a stable and safe Iraq?

After Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany and mobilized for what manythought would be a repeat of the stalemateof World War I. The Nazis and the Soviet Union quickly conquered Poland. For the nextseven months, neither the allies, safe behind the impregnable Maginot Line, nor the Nazis took the offensive. This so-called “phony war” deluded many in Britain and France to believe that Hitler had been stopped. The spring blitzkrieg not only obliterated that delusion, it showed how unprepared the allies were for the real war that followed.

Sixty-four years later, Iraq is not Europe and there is no Hitler. But the stakes in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq are enormous. There also appears to have been something of a phony war for the past 12 months, at least, in the belief that the major dangers in Iraq have been contained. And the state of American preparedness for the next phase is an open question.

A little over a year ago, as coalition troops raced toward Baghdad, a principal fear was whether Saddam Hussein would turn his cities into battlegrounds. Fortunately, because of the skill and audacity of America’s military and the crumbling of Saddam’s authority, street-to-street fighting and urban warfare were avoided, and Baghdad quickly fell. Violence, of course, was not eliminated, and, over the ensuing 12 months, coalition troops and civilians died, as insurgents and jihadists launched attacks aimed at disrupting and terrorizing those who were out to bring peace and democracy to Iraq. Now, that insurgency threatens to spill over.

Whatever period of grace the coalition may have had in bringing peace to Iraq, it would be tragic error to assume a lot of time is left before violence becomes endemic. A fledgling intifada — meaning to “spin off” in Arabic — could metastasize, as in Palestine, into a festering uprising. Whether the Shia majority will become so disenfranchised and dissatisfied with the occupation to escalate any intifada into “the mother of all political nightmares” for the coalition is no longer an idle question. How this happened and what can be done are not idle questions either.

First, the Bush administration was too optimistic about overcoming the difficulties of making Iraq into a democratic state. It also has been unwilling to take a hard look at its plans, policies and assumptions, fearing that such a review might convey the perception of “weakness” at home and abroad. And its consistently determined defense of its actions has prevented any serious reassessment of U.S. policy toward Iraq and the reconstruction process.

Second, irrespective of the absence of a larger credible international coalition committed to rebuilding Iraq, the failure to understand the complicated social, cultural and religious interactions among Shia, Sunni and Kurds, and the failure to put in place what was seen by most Iraqis as a credible and legitimate governing council had at least two highly negative consequences. Expectations among Iraqis as to the pace of reconstruction were made excessively high, and, unknowingly, the coalition had a set a time limit to make good on those commitments. That time has or is about to run out.

As a result, while the situation in Iraq is not yet out of control, this tipping point may not be far off. An intifada could become inevitable. And civil war has been privately predicted by knowledgeable senior members of Congress and the administration as early as this summer.

The situation is not desperate, provided we undertake a serious examination of what has gone right and wrong, what more must be done and identify the means to achieve those ends now. To prevent against a Maginot-Line mentality taking hold, the administration should convene, in private, a “counsel of war” to include respected people from Congress and outside government, possibly including allies, to take stock of what must be done and hopefully to achieve a consensus that is currently lacking. Agreeing on immediate reform and restructuring of the reconstruction effort, hopelessly bogged down in bureaucratic red tape, is one example of necessary remedial action.

This is not early 1940. War in Iraq is real. It is America’s responsibility to ensure that we prevail. So far, the administration cannot assure either the public or the Iraqis that we have made our best efforts to that noble end.