… and aftershocks

Ever since there have been wars, revolutions, popular uprisings or liberation movements as well as leaders spearheading such movements, there have also been others trying to silence them by seeking their physical elimination.

The Israelis were certainly not the first to conceive of “targeted killings,” or political assassinations, to thwart terrorist acts directed against them. But it would be worth a look back to see if these acts ever accomplished anything concrete, other than strengthening the targets’ resolve.

Let’s not for now dwell too much on ancient history, where intrigue, conspiracy and killing were as common as the head cold. Let’s jump directly into the mid-20th century.

Throughout the Algerian war of independence. from 1954 to 1962, and during which members of the National Liberation Front — known by its French acronym, FLN — were hunted down, arrested, interrogated, ruthlessly tortured and liquidated, in hopes of decapitating the movement and ending the revolt.

France in the Algerian war found itself in a situation at times analogous to that of Israel today. It was fighting for territory it believed was justly part of France. Algeria was not a colony. As early as 1848, it was made a department and attached to France. It enjoyed the same status as the Savoie or the Dordogne.

France’s government regarded the Algerian nationalists’ liberation movement as secessionist and labeled its members “terrorists.” The French military was called in to deal with the uprising heavy-handedly, and targeted the top nationalist leaders for arrest, imprisonment and assassination.

The government closed its eyes to vigilante groups who carried out on their own unauthorized activities against the Arabs. French settlers in Algeria undertook “ratonnades,” (rat hunts) where Arabs — not always those associated with the FLN — were beaten and killed.

By 1956, the conflict’s second year, France had committed more than 400,000 troops to Algeria, including elite units such as the Foreign Legion. Despite dealing setbacks, all that effort did not stop the move toward independence. In fact, it seemed to have quite the opposite effect, cementing Algerian resolve and drawing more supporters and sympathizers to the revolution. Eventually, the French were forced to leave.

Since the start of organized Palestinian resistance in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day Arab-Israeli war, better-armed Israel, much like France in Algeria, has found itself fighting a mostly disorganized, often divided, guerrilla force.

Israel, too, tried many times to eliminate Palestinian leaders, hoping to block the resistance. In the 1970s, Israel undertook a series of assassinations of Palestinian leaders living in Lebanon and Europe.

In April 1973, an Israeli commando group headed by Ehud Barak — who later became prime minister — carried out a daring raid in the heart of Beirut.

The commandos attacked the building housing three prominent Palestine Liberation Organization chiefs in a residential quarter of Beirut. In minutes, they gunned down Kamal Adwan, newly named chief of all guerrilla activities in all the occupied territories; Kamal Nasser, a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) spokesman; and Abu Youssef (Mohammad Youssef al-Najjar), a PLO political officer.

In its long and bloody war with the Palestinians, Israeli intelligence officers also mailed exploding letters to several PLO officials, a number of whom were killed. Others, such as Bassam Abu Sharif, a former spokesman for the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was “luckier,” escaping with severe injuries to his face and hands.

There were times when innocents were killed. In January 1974. Israel’s Mossad agents misidentified Ahmad Boushiki, an Algerian waiter carrying a Moroccan passport in the Norwegian town of Lillehammer, as Ali Hassan Salameh, and shot him dead.

The real Salameh headed PLO security and was suspected of masterminding Black September, the group responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack on Israeli athletes. Eleven Israeli athletes died in that raid. Salameh, also known as Abu Hassan, was killed in Beirut in 1979 by a booby-trapped car timed to explode as he drove past.

Among the top Palestinians killed were Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), who ranked only behind PLO chief Yasser Arafat and his deputy, Abu Jihad. Khalaf was killed in Tunis in March 1991. The highest PLO leader assassinated was Mr. Arafat’s deputy, Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), also killed in Tunis in April 1988.

This brings us to the two most-recent “targeted killings,” those of Sheik Ahmed Yassin, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its Arabic acronym, Hamas, on March 22, and the killing last April 17 of his replacement, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi. Both were killed by missiles fired from Israeli attack helicopters in Gaza.

A relevant question to ponder: Have any of these political assassinations succeeded in the long run? With hindsight, did any of the killings accomplish anything beyond revenge?

Do “targeted killings” really deter and force policy change, or have the opposite effect and increase support for “the cause”?

There is little doubt Hamas will have no trouble finding someone to step into the leadership role, despite the apparent risks. A better question, perhaps, might be how to end the never-ending cycle of violence.

Claude Salhani is international editor for United Press International.