The view from Kurdistan

For the people of Kurdistan, this weekend was spoiled. Not because Muqtada al-Sadr ranted on in Friday prayers about sending suicide bombers, nor because the tentative cease-fire in Fallujah. But because it rained. And rain ruins the religiously followed Kurdish tradition of picnic day, when the cities empty as people take to green mountains to grill meat, drink beer and dance the day away.

Like other Iraqis, the Kurds are enjoying a Saddam-free spring. But unlike the rest of the country, they have been thriving in post-liberation Iraq. They view the events in Fallujah and Najaf with both a sense of detachment and of caution.

Caution because to some extent Kurds feel they are victims of their own success.

Within the green line, the area about the size of New England that has been under Kurdish control since 1991, there is low unemployment (workers are imported from other parts of Iraq and even from Iran), a building boom, minimal interference from neighboring countries and a tolerant open-mindedness not seen in the rest of the country.

The word “occupation” is never uttered in Kurdistan. On the contrary, the Kurds say that the U.S. Army is the first army in history to enter Kurdistan not as an invading force.

The main reason for this pro-American attitude is that the Kurds themselves have been — and still are — running their own affairs, albeit with a recent infusion of U.S. money. They have well-established ministries that provide education, health care, water and garbage pick-up. They have a police force that actually protects the people and solid intelligence that almost without fail keeps the jihadis and former Ba’athists at bay.

When things go wrong — and at times they do — fingers are not pointed at the Americans. It is the Kurdish administrations that have to answer to the people, and at times they do.

To spread this attitude to the rest of the country while keeping the momentum in Kurdistan, the United States needs to recognize Kurdish exceptionality: The Kurds are situated differently, but not so different that they cannot serve as a model for the rest of the country. They are taking responsibility upon themselves to make the most of the postwar situation.

This recognition should not be limited to words. It must be translated into practice to encourage the Kurds and motivate the rest of the country to do the same.

Economically, the Coalition Provisional Authority should foster investment in this Western-friendly and secure area. Encouraging foreign venture capital in the north and its resulting material comfort for citizens will send a strong message to the rest of Iraq that prosperity comes only with security.

While minimal U.S. political presence in Kurdistan is proving beneficial, the Kurds fear they may be neglected and held back while the rest of the country catches up to them.

The political issues of most concern to the Kurds are, first, a return of Kurdish lands ethnically cleansed and a restoration of the property claims of those hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Turkoman and Christians displaced by the Ba’ath regime.

While the three governorates inside the green line have been under Kurdish control since 1991, they contain only two-thirds of the Kurdish-inhabited areas of the country. The other third borders the three governorates and includes ethnically diverse Kirkuk. This entire area remains outside of present-day Kurdistan.

The gerrymandering of the governorate boundaries over several decades and the subsequent ethnic-cleansing of the area by the former regime should not be allowed to stand.

Since liberation, the Kurds had assumed these lands would be returned to Kurdistan. So far those desires have been delayed by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) signed in March, which provides a rather vaguely worded roadmap for a future normalization process.

The TAL states that these lands would remain outside Kurdish control for now, but can be decided upon after a census and the transitional period, and taking into account “the will of the people of those territories.”

The United States needs to clearly communicate its commitment to the TAL normalization process to assure the Kurds it will be observed despite the uncertainty of events in the rest of the country.

To hold back on normalization of these areas for fear of an Arab backlash is to legitimize Saddam’s Arabization campaign.

A second political issue is elections. There is no reason why Kurds should wait for the rest of the country to hold elections in their safe and secure region. The last regional elections were in 1992, which the Kurds organized themselves with no outside prompting. But this parliament and government needs to be updated by popular vote to institute a popular and representative government.

Elections in Kurdistan would also force the two Kurdish administrations to unite; a process all Kurds think is long overdue.

The snail’s pace of political change on these two issues close to Kurdish hearts, coupled with the shaky security in the center and south, increases Kurdish fears for the future. This could subsequently diminish their trust in and their support of the United States.

Some may argue that recognition of the Kurdish exceptionality by the United States constitutes “preferential treatment of the Kurds” and will divide Iraq. It won’t.

The Kurds themselves reject independence and are busy welcoming Arab workers, students and tourists who come from the center and south of Iraq in search of jobs, education and mountain recreation.

Kurds want a unified Iraq. But an Iraq that is at least as economically healthy and as secure as their region.

Hiwa Osman is a Baghdad-based journalist.