Is it over, ‘over there’?

In 1917, America’s boys were sent “over there” to win the war to end all wars. Over there was France; we won the war and then lost the peace. Today, American fighting men and women are over there again. “Over there,” of course, is Iraq. And, after the brilliant military victory over Saddam Hussein, a year later there are increasingly sinister signs that, for this phase of the occupation in restoring stability and building democracy, it may be over, over there.

America’s position in Iraq, eerily,is akin to the first months of World War II, before the victoriesat Midway and El Alamein in mid-1942 turned the tide of battle. We are still gearing up, but have not stopped the rot, in this case the mounting insurgency. Despite the valor, effort and progress in Iraq, Americans are still looking for the political equivalent of those battles to turn the tide in that beleaguered state.

Events of the past few weeks, amplified by Bob Woodward’s latest book, “Plan of Attack,” have fueled controversy. Catalyzed by Mr. Woodward’s account of how the Bush administration went to and fought the war, Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Vietnam War are front and center in the media. The term quagmire is back in vogue.

Mr. Powell has been criticized by some for not opposing the war more forcefully and not committing professional hara-kiri by resigning in protest. Others have chastised the secretary for wanting it both ways — criticizing the decision for war all too publicly to save his reputation but remaining in office and therefore being disloyal to the president. The truth is that both sets of criticisms about Mr. Powell miss a more important point. Mr. Powell is seen as such a larger-than-life figure that many Americans expected larger-than-life achievements simply not possible in an administration determined to go to war and disinclined to listen to dissenting views.

Here, recollections of Vietnam are relevant. Mr. Powell has cited, both in the media and in his memoir, “My American Journey,” many of the major reasons why America was defeated in that war. First, the enemy understood that political victory was the goal. The enemy proved tougher, smarter, more determined and more adaptable than we did. Indeed, we relied on a military solution that could never work and our senior political leaders were supremely ignorant of Vietnamese culture, politics and psychology.

Second, we fought the war rotating our troops every 12 months (13 for the Marines), assuring turmoil. Third, there was no unity of command. Several different and simultaneous air, ground and “secret” wars were fought with little or no coordination.

In Iraq, we are relying on a military instrument that can never bring a political victory. Our failure to grasp Iraqi culture is stunningly illuminated by one anecdotal piece of evidence. Not long ago, a white, Christian American, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer (as opposed to an Iraqi Muslim spokesman), appeared on Iraqi television to announce that Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of a murdered and revered Shia cleric and himself a cleric, was wanted “dead or alive.” Rest assured, that message was not well received by most Iraqis.

Instead of 12-month rotations, for many civilians who volunteered to work in the Coalition Provisional Authority, three- or four-month tours were all that were required. And regarding unity of command, it is fair to ask who is in charge in Iraq. The failures we experienced in Vietnam cannot be repeated in Iraq if we are to prevail.

The reality is that by not quitting, Mr. Powell has kept his powder dry. On June 30, some degree of sovereignty will revert back to Iraq and the State Department will presumably take on a more authoritative role.

This would be the time for President Bush to ask Mr. Powell to accept the toughest assignment of his career. Someone of extraordinary ability needs to be in charge in Iraq. Mr. Powell is the single individual who comes closest to that criterion. And the lessons of Vietnam he so well understands will help.

In charge means just that — in complete charge of both the civil and military sides of the house. The coordination, as we are seeing in the siege of Fallujah, must be perfect if we are to achieve a political success.

It is also possible that events in Iraq have conspired to the point where, short of dispatching tens of thousands more troops as recommended over a year ago by then-Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, there are few good options even for a Powell.

Time is running out. In a matter of months, the foundations for joining or winning the political equivalent of the battles of Midway and El Alamein must be in place. If not, it could truly turn out to be over, over there.