Offensive against bioterrorism

While coalition forces have been fighting terrorists armed with guns and grenades, an even grimmer threat continues to gather. Given the catastrophic consequences of a successful large-scale bioterror attack, the administration has been wise to prepare against it.

President Bush signed a secret directive outlining the next campaigns in bioterrorism preparedness last week and released a declassified version earlier this week. The directive consists of several initiatives to strengthen national preparedness. It calls for a national risk assessment of new bioterror threats every two years and a “net assessment” of overall bioterrorism preparedness every four years. It orders intelligence officers to examine organisms that terrorists might genetically modify and “weaponize,” and directs the Environmental Protection Agency to make detailed plans for decontamination areas hit by biological weapons. BioWatch, a network of biological sensors around major cities, will be improved. The directive also allocates funds for the creation of the National Biosurveillance Group, which is to be the clearinghouse for assessing biological threats. Assessments from that group will be sent to other government agencies.

The classified portion of the directive is said to put a strong emphasis on protecting water supplies, possibly in partial response to the specific threat al Qaeda made about a year ago. The threat against water supplies does not seem to have ebbed. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, CIA Director George Tenet said, “We particularly see a heightened risk of poison attacks.”

Mr. Bush has issued a number of other presidential directives on homeland security. The comprehensive review that led to the latest directive was led by retired Gen. John Gordon. It was designed to discover gaps in biodefenses, provide federal personnel better direction and assist policy-makers in setting priorities in agency budgets.

Even before the directive was issued, substantial progress had been made in bioterrorism preparedness. The administration has spent more than $10 billion on bioterrorism defenses since 2001. Tangible results from that spending include the establishment of the BioWatch system, the development of new vaccines against anthrax and Ebola, and the procurement of enough smallpox vaccine to inoculate all citizens.

Other problems remain — the smallpox vaccination plan has stalled, while funding for Project Bioshield is still stuck in the Senate. Policy-makers still have a great deal of work in front of them, but the strategy outlined by the presidential directive is another positive step, one demanded by the ever-evolving threat of bioterrorism.