ANALYSIS/OPINION:
As that old saying goes, the French have a word for it: “deformation professionelle.” It means to judge wrongly as a result of one’s occupation. Thus, as a first reaction to a problem, a surgeon might be tempted to cut more quickly than he should, a lawyer to litigate, a teacher to instruct, etc. Obviously, a diplomat might have a bias toward negotiating when confronting a geopolitical crisis.
But therein lies the rub. Negotiations for the sake of negotiations often result in disaster. That is particularly true with U.S. diplomats, steeped in that powerful American ethos to be successful, to see any negotiation as having to have a fruitful outcome that leads to a mutually acceptable compromise between the parties. In a particularly grim situation, to avoid violence and war, the goal is obviously laudatory.
Furthermore, negotiations often take place in an exotic world — conducted within the imitation military hierarchy of the U.S. Foreign Service, in primitive locales or in the world’s fleshpots, in foreign languages, employing the arcane vocabulary of “diplomatese.” The jargon and the “modalities” often intimidate the outsider, especially other Americans whose preoccupation is with domestic affairs rather than the elite world of diplomats.
It explains, in part, why so many politicians appointed secretary of state have become prisoners of the professional diplomats in Foggy Bottom, turning against their own earlier, deeply held positions. Hillary Rodham Clinton is only the latest victim; even a foreign-policy expert like President George W. Bush’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, succumbed. The stereotypical American, on the other hand, attempts to simply to cut the Gordian knot - to slice through verbiage and cut a deal. President Obama calls this “a comprehensive solution.” But more often, the issues being addressed are difficult, complex, long-term problems, where an overall solution requires too many concessions by too many interests.
Furthermore, if you are negotiating outside the norm of the circle of peaceful and friendly, democratic nations, you have a bigger problem. A stonewalling opponent may strengthen his position by stringing along his American counterpart. That simply means that, in the end, the U.S. diplomat makes whatever concessions are necessary to get “a successful outcome,” defined as, at minimum, a “settlement.” The end result is often not a compromise, but a surrender.
American diplomatic history is replete with examples of where we fell into this trap. And at the moment, the Obama administration appears locked in two such enterprises, which bear intense scrutiny for this very reason. This administration did not create them, of course, nor, indeed, were they created in the eight years under Mr. Bush. Rather their origins are buried in a long past.
• The sinking of a South Korean warship by a North Korean submarine has raised the ante in the long-standing dispute on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang represents a bankrupt regime - both morally and economically. Starvation and malnutrition are the norm for its 23 million people. Now a new crisis arises from the collapse of a dysfunctional family in the only communist monarchy. The dilemma for the regime — and for Washington — is that North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il seems to think that to move toward proffered help for liberalization of his economy (even along the lines of “the China model”) would begin a total disintegration, much like that which overtook Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania.
• Coincidentally — although the two regimes have done as much as they can to reinforce one another — Washington is attempting to negotiate its way out of the threat of an aggressive regime in Tehran developing nuclear weapons. Although the mullahs, in one of the most corrupt regimes in the long history of Persian abuse of power, have managed to enrich themselves, their economy hangs by a thread. Huge exports of oil, at prices the former shah only dreamed of, are not enough to fund an enormous weapons program, a worldwide terrorist and subversion network, the needs of a rapidly expanding population and any real economic development. But the dream of rebuilding the ancient Persian empire and dominating the Middle East and its oil resources are goals the current rulers may not abandon — without ensuring their own demise.
Into this arena, the Obama administration — led by its diplomatic corps — has plunged. Mr. Obama has apologized for what he sees as past moral and strategic mistakes of American policy. And he has launched a wide-ranging effort to initiate negotiations with these adversarial regimes.
The question is, of course, that old American philosophical one: Will it work? Is this American pragmatism, or is it an ideological approach to problems doomed to even greater disasters than the torpedoing on one ally’s ship?
• Sol Sanders, veteran foreign correspondent and analyst, writes weekly on the convergence of international politics, business and economics. He can be reached at solsanders@cox.net
Please read our comment policy before commenting.