OPINION:
President Trump’s recent suggestion that he could use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China is a stark reminder of what a political issue arms sales to Taiwan can be. The Department of War’s comments that they are pausing the $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, supposedly due to the war in Iran, present a major concern that Mr. Trump is taking a dovish turn toward China.
But this is not the only challenge these arms sales face; they have been dogged by excessive delays for decades.
For more than a decade, Taiwan’s defense planning has lived with a structural contradiction. Washington regularly signals political support by approving arms sales, yet the actual delivery of those systems often arrives years later.
The problem is widely referred to as the “arms backlog.” Yet the term obscures more than it reveals. The backlog is a complex set of procurement cases shaped by industrial constraints, bureaucratic processes, and political incentives on both sides of the Pacific. Understanding why delays occur and why they matter is essential to restoring confidence in the defense relationship between Washington and Taipei.
The political theater of arms sales
Arms sales to Taiwan have been an integral part of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed to address the political, economic, and military relationship between the United States and Taiwan after America switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Beijing, in turn, always reacts sharply whenever Washington announces a major sale, signaling both its opposition to external support for Taiwan and an effort to raise the political cost of approving arms sales in Washington. Over time, this dynamic has encouraged some U.S. policymakers to manage the timing of arms sales announcements carefully, occasionally delaying notifications to avoid diplomatic escalation.
This political choreography creates a subtle but important distortion. Arms sales announcements often function as signals of U.S. commitment, yet the equipment itself may not arrive for years. The arms backlog is an estimated $29.7 billion today, according to the Taiwan Security Monitor at George Mason University, and average deliveries over the past decade have been between $4 billion and $5 billion per year.
The four factors in the “backlog” story
In Taiwan’s public debate, the arms backlog is often portrayed as a simple story: Taiwan orders weapons, pays for them, and then waits while Washington fails to deliver.
The reality is far more complicated. The backlog comprises numerous procurement cases across categories of weapons, timelines, and sales mechanisms. Some systems are partially delivered while others are impacted by production constraints. Four recurring constraints account for most of the backlog.
The first is industrial capacity, as modern weapons systems utilize specialized manufacturing lines that cannot easily scale. The wars in Ukraine and Iran have placed an enormous strain on the U.S. defense industrial base. Many of the systems Taiwan seeks are also in high demand from the U.S. military and NATO allies. While the United States is working aggressively to increase munitions output, it cannot expand production overnight.
The second constraint is program complexity. Large platforms require years to assemble, test, and integrate, involving hundreds of components and extensive training pipelines. Even after delivery, a system may not be fully operational without spare parts, maintenance infrastructure and properly trained personnel.
Third, bureaucratic procedures slow the process. U.S. arms sales move through multiple stages: technology release reviews, policy approvals, congressional notifications, contracting and production. These procedures ensure oversight and compliance but were not designed for speed. Even repeat purchases can take years to process.
Finally, buyer-side factors also play a role. Changes in Taiwan’s requirements, delays in funding approvals or gaps in training infrastructure can slow deliveries or reduce readiness once systems arrive. Procurement is not simply about acquiring hardware; it requires an entire ecosystem capable of absorbing and effectively employing the equipment.
Taken together, these four factors compound to slow nearly every defense procurement decision that runs through Washington. In the case of Taiwan, however, these flaws are exacerbated by the two mechanisms Taipei uses to acquire most U.S. defense equipment: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS).
Under the FMS system, the U.S. government acts as an intermediary between the purchasing country and American defense contractors. Taiwan submits a request outlining the capabilities it seeks, which is then evaluated and, if both governments agree, signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), which formalizes the government-to-government agreement. The United States then contracts with industry, manages procurement, and oversees delivery, training, and sustainment. FMS provides transparency and integration support with U.S. forces, but the main downside is that it can move slowly.
DCS purchases are when Taiwan contracts directly with U.S. defense companies and obtains export licenses from the U.S. government. These arrangements can sometimes proceed more quickly and offer greater flexibility for certain types of equipment, particularly components, software, or niche capabilities. Unfortunately, many advanced weapons systems cannot be transferred through direct commercial contracts due to government oversight requirements. DCS purchases may also provide less integration support and logistical coordination than FMS. As a result, Taiwan must balance speed against interoperability and long-term sustainment.
These procedures make even simple purchases very complicated, yet these complexities rarely appear in political discourse.
Instead, the dominant narrative on both sides of the Pacific is the most corrosive, transforming defense procurement into a credibility test for both governments. In Taiwan, it fuels skepticism about the value of defense spending. Opposition politicians can argue that the government is wasting money on weapons that never arrive. In Washington, political infighting over defense spending risks being read as a lack of commitment and casts doubts about whether Taiwan can absorb and employ the systems it purchases.
The strategic costs of delay
Delivery delays have consequences that extend beyond inventory shortages. Defense spending in democratic societies is always contested. Arms delivery delays amplify that tension by providing a simple and emotionally powerful grievance: Taiwan paid for weapons but has not received them.
Critics then argue that Taipei should diversify suppliers or rely more heavily on domestic defense production. Both options face serious limitations, but the argument gains traction when delays persist.
The result is that debates over military strategy become partisan identity markers rather than strategic discussions. When procurement becomes entangled in political conflict, the continuity necessary for long-term deterrence begins to weaken.
These issues also come to the fore directly at the water’s edge. Taiwan’s defense strategy increasingly emphasizes denying China from achieving a quick military victory. That strategy depends on survivable command systems, dispersed forces, and sufficient stockpiles of munitions to sustain combat in the opening phase of a conflict.
If key weapons are delayed, Taiwan risks having systems approved on paper but unavailable when needed. Conversely, even when equipment arrives, insufficient training or integration can limit its operational impact.
Delays in arms purchases due to political controversy or bureaucratic delays in Taiwan can cause U.S. policymakers to misinterpret Taiwan’s commitment to self-defense. Additionally, delays can appear as an opportunity for Beijing. If Chinese planners believe Taiwan cannot rearm quickly, they may perceive a window to intensify coercion or test the limits of deterrence. Even if that perception is mistaken, it can increase the risk of miscalculation.
How to break the cycle
The top priority is industrial capacity. Washington must treat weapons production for Taiwan not merely as a diplomatic commitment but as a top manufacturing priority. Expanding production lines for key munitions would benefit U.S. forces, Taiwan, and other allies. Congress should provide sustained funding and long-term demand signals for industry.
Second, the arms sales process itself needs modernization. A dedicated interagency “Taiwan fast lane” could accelerate case processing and coordinate across agencies responsible for export controls, congressional notifications, and contracting. Streamlining repeat purchases especially for systems already approved for other allies would significantly reduce bureaucratic delays.
Third, Washington should make greater use of flexible delivery mechanisms, such as stock transfers, to help bridge the gap between procurement approval and full system delivery.
Taiwan must also adapt its procurement strategy. Taipei should prioritize capabilities that can be fielded quickly and that strengthen denial: mobile missile systems, sea mines, drones, resilient communications networks and munitions stockpiles. Large platforms still play an important role, but they should not crowd out investments that deliver immediate operational value.
Equally important, Taiwan must invest in the infrastructure needed to absorb new systems. Training pipelines, logistics networks and maintenance capacity determine whether delivered equipment becomes operational capability.
Finally, political discipline is essential. Defense procurement should be a bipartisan national priority in Taiwan, not a political “football.” Sustained deterrence cannot depend on short-term political cycles.
Deterrence now depends on delivery
In earlier decades, the approval of an arms sale was considered a sufficient political symbol. Today, symbolism is no longer enough. Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait depends on what can actually be produced, delivered, trained, and deployed within the relevant timeframe.
The arms backlog, therefore, offers a warning for both sides to both match defense spending with institutional discipline and to ensure the industrial base can translate policy decisions into operational capabilities.
If Washington and Taipei treat the backlog as a shared operational challenge rather than a political talking point, meaningful progress is possible. Faster production, smarter procurement, greater transparency, and stronger political consensus can restore confidence in the system.
Those steps will not eliminate the risks facing Taiwan. But they will convince any potential aggressor that war would be neither quick nor decisive and therefore not worth starting.
• Jason Hsu served as a Member of Taiwan’s Legislature from 2016 to 2020 and is currently a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Rear Admiral (Ret.) U.S. Navy Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at Foundation for Defense for Democracies.
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