Close the verification gap

OPINION:

“Trust but verify” has been a bedrock of our relationship with Moscow since President Reagan first pronounced the principle during his Cold War negotiations with the Soviet Union.

After communism fell, America’s first major treaty with Russia and the other newly democratic former Soviet states that possessed weapons, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), contained a detailed verification system, including intrusive on-site inspections.

However, this comprehensive verification regime, which undergirds every existing U.S.-Russian strategic arms control treaty, will expire Dec. 5. Unless Congress moves quickly to replace the regime with a short-term fix, important continuity and confidence will be lost, putting at risk our working relationship with Russia and, ultimately, our national security interests.

Most directly, the end of verification inspections will affect what has become the central strategic arms agreement between the two countries, the 2003 Moscow Treaty, which commits each side to cutting its nuclear warheads to 1,700. That agreement, which expires in 2012, contains no verification mechanisms of its own, relying instead on those in START, which expires in December.

In 2002, when the Moscow Treaty was before the Senate, the Bush administration assured Congress there was plenty of time to negotiate a new START treaty with updated verification procedures, or to place them in the Moscow Treaty. The clock has been ticking since, but the George W. Bush administration did not complete talks on a replacement document.

To its credit, when the Obama administration took office, it moved to accelerate the pace of START negotiations. But even if those talks produce an agreement by Dec. 5, the inspections will stop until a new treaty is ratified by the Senate, which could take many months. At the moment, there is no legal way to continue inspections in the United States without a ratified treaty in place.

These inspections are not some Cold War anachronism. They are essential to give both sides confidence there is no militarily significant cheating. The United States has conducted more than 600 START inspections - an average of 40 per year - in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. Russia has conducted more than 400 in the United States.

Such intrusive on-site investigations permit us to verify the kinds and types of Russian weapons being deployed and also to examine modified versions of Russia’s weapons. Experience over the years has proved the effectiveness of this process. America is far safer as a result of those 600 START inspections than we would be without them.

The U.S.-Russia negotiations on a START follow-on in Geneva may well produce more cuts in nuclear arsenals. I understand the new pact will rely, in part, on START’s verification regime. If so, that would be a sign that we can maintain confidence in the arms-control process.

But continuity is important. A verification gap would be dangerous and would not be in our interest or Russia’s. That’s why I have just introduced legislation to continue inspections and monitoring after Dec. 5. It is no substitute for a treaty, but it provides a way to continue inspections until a new verification regime is ratified.

The bill would allow the president to extend, on a reciprocal basis, the privileges and immunities to Russian arms inspectors when they come to the United States for START inspections. It does not require the administration to admit Russian inspection teams in the absence of reciprocity by Moscow. A temporary measure, it expires in the middle of next year, or sooner if a new treaty comes into force.

I urge Congress and the administration to move quickly to approve and implement this legislation. We must not allow to lapse a principle that has served us well in protecting our national security since Mr. Reagan’s presidency.

Sen. Richard G. Lugar of Indiana is the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.