BOOK REVIEW: ‘Principled Spying’ by David Omand and Mark Phythian

OPINION:

PRINCIPLED SPYING: THE ETHICS OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE

By David Omand and Mark Phythian

Georgetown University Press, $32.95, 304 pages

The conflicting views of the ethics of intelligence, as seen by professionals of the trade, were put into sharp contrast in testimony before the Church Committee in the 1970s.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of central intelligence during the Clinton administration, testified, “There is one overall test of the ethics of human intelligence activities. That is whether those approving them feel they could defend their actions before the public if the actions became public.”

Adm. Turner’s rule contrasted sharply with that of James J. Angleton, the CIA’s longtime intelligence chief, who thought it “inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government.”

Even persons who admired the quirky James Angleton felt that he went a step too far in his claims for intelligence independence.

But what Mr. Angleton had in mind, on examination, is rather obvious: Oftentimes the people who run the government — from the White House on down — do not wish to take responsibility for actions that they desire, and that contrary rules exist primarily to provide them a protective shield of denial.

At hand is a civilized debate between two British intelligence specialists, Sir David Omand, formerly director of GCHQ, the British signals intelligence and cybersecurity agency, and Mark Phythian, professor of history at the University of Leicester and co-editor of the journal Intelligence and National Security.

Both acknowledge the necessity of intelligence. The authors agree that “there always will be potential threats to the state and society that the government must counter.”

However, as Mr. Phythian asserts, “Secrecy is not only a widely recognized requirement of effective intelligence but also a potential obstacle to democratic legitimacy.”

On the other hand, Mr. Omand notes, “secretaries of state [must] apply political and foreign policy judgment — with an ethical dimension — to the wisdom of intelligence operations and not to rely just on senior judges and lawyers to certify their legality.”

The basic ground rules for U.S. intelligence were laid out in 1954 by a presidential panel — the Hoover Commission — which cited “an implacable foe whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and whatever cost.”

The commission continued, “There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing norms of human conduct do not apply . We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services [and] employ “more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us.”

Given the existence of an acknowledged enemy — the Soviet Union — a vast majority of the American public was content that the Central Intelligence Agency and assorted cousins did what they wished with official impunity. Congress expressed no desire to oversee government-toppling operations, not even presidential approval of assassinations.

But with the Cold War at an end, the question of intelligence ethics mushroomed. The Sept. 11 attacks and the seemingly incessant war against terrorism has caused a refocusing of intelligence energies.

For instance, the use of an occasional wiretap against a suspected enemy has morphed into an extensive use of electronic intercepts, both of telephone and internet communications.

Western agencies especially have relied on electronic interceptions and covert agents to identify and eliminate persons bent upon violence.

Another new and controversial tactic — the use of drone attacks against suspected terrorists — is by nature a military undertaking, but heavily reliant on intelligence for target selections.

These attacks, commenced during the Obama administration and continued under President Trump, have led to uncountable “friendly fire” deaths of innocent persons, and resultant criticisms of the intelligence community.

Mr. Phythian seems especially disturbed about the use of undercover informants in intelligence operations. His concern is traceable to wide use of informants by British agencies in a decades-long battle with Irish separatists.

As he documents, a number of these “agents” became involved in violence themselves, resulting in the murder of a police officer in one instance.

Unfortunately, even such noble-appearing groups, such as anti-war protesters, can harbor pockets of hard-noses who are not reluctant to take up bombs to further their cause.

Strictures on CIA and other groups have tightened significantly the last two decades. After years of indifference, Congress has bestirred itself to create oversight committees. Significant covert actions must be approved by the White House and reported to Congress.

The current generation of CIA officers seems reconciled — if not totally happy — with the new rules.

But several retirees hark back to a comment by the late Ray Cline, a veteran both of OSS and CIA: “Must the United States respond like a man in a barroom brawl who will fight only to the Marquis of Queensberry rules?”

The debate will continue. “Principled Spying” provides valuable both-sides arguments on the issue that warrant a read by both intelligence professionals and the lay citizen alike.

• Joseph C. Goulden writes frequently on intelligence and military affairs.