OPINION:
On a gleaming Swiss mountaintop in June, American and Iranian officials launched talks for a final agreement to end the war in the Middle East.
The venue, a glamorous resort where once upon a time Audrey Hepburn and Mel Ferrer tied the knot, is today owned by the state of Qatar. The image is richly poetic.
Qatar, a tiny yet extravagantly wealthy country, has built a reputation on investment and dealmaking. The same could be said about President Trump — except that Mr. Trump is known for making good deals, and the Qataris have a habit of brokering bad ones.
The record speaks for itself.
After the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, political tensions in Lebanon escalated. The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah exacerbated a tenuous situation. Clashes erupted in the streets of Beirut in 2007 and again in 2008.
Qatar stepped into the breach.
The 2008 Doha Agreement thwarted civil war, but by ceding political power to Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.
In the Gaza Strip, Qatar mediated between Israel and Hamas during the 2014 and 2021 conflicts. Twice, Doha produced temporary quiet. However, Hamas remained in power and continued to rake in money from Qatar, enabling the terrorist group to amass offensive power ahead of its Oct. 7, 2023, massacre in Israel.
That slaughter of more than 1,200 Israelis provided Qatar with another diplomatic opportunity. It took two years to free every last hostage and secure a lasting ceasefire — and that deal landed only after the Israeli air force targeted Hamas operatives on Qatari soil.
Eight months later, progress has stalled. Hamas remains armed. Qatari mediators are now reportedly in favor of conditioning Hamas’ disarmament on Israeli actions.
In Syria, Qatar has repeatedly intervened to free hostages captured by the al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front and its successor group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. American freelance journalist Theo Padnos was one of them. However, Mr. Padnos’ freedom, like many others, was secured through a multimillion-dollar ransom payment.
Qatar also reportedly paid more than $1 billion, split between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to free 28 hostages, including 25 Qatari citizens. So the country succeeded by enriching terrorists and incentivizing hostage-taking.
Time and again, Doha has notched its wins by financing, normalizing or strengthening bad actors. Other times, its wins have simply proved temporary.
The same risks are surfacing with Iran.
As part of a future deal, Tehran is demanding access to billions of dollars in frozen assets, including at least $6 billion held in Qatari banks. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian claimed in June that the $6 billion in Qatar “will be released and returned to the country.”
American officials said that is not the case, but they are reportedly working with Doha to unlock funds for humanitarian purchases. Absent proper oversight, Qatar could allow Tehran to divert the money for military or other prohibited purposes — a possibility that seems less remote when one remembers that Doha has historically supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Vice President J.D. Vance also told the media about a “deconfliction mechanism” with representatives from U.S. Central Command and the IRGC that planned to set up shop in Qatar. Given Doha’s history enabling Iran and its proxies, there is reason to worry that any outcomes such a channel produces will not be favorable to America.
Mr. Trump might have declared the ceasefire “over,” but when Washington is again in the market for a peace broker, policymakers should ask: Does Qatar’s record pass muster? The answer is not as convenient as they might like.
• Natalie Ecanow is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow Natalie on X @NatalieEcanow. Follow FDD on X @FDD.
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