OPINION:
On June 11, Beijing designated the Taiwan Strait and several areas around it as “coastal waters,” a component of internal waters under international law. This cannot be ignored.
Articles 8 through 11 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea define the scope of a coastal nation’s “internal waters,” over which states have far more authority than over their territorial waters. Beijing’s declaration stated specifically that “the waters east of Taiwan are our coastal waters where we are present, exercise jurisdiction and govern.”
The U.S. and international community must immediately reject that claim. Otherwise, Beijing will interpret the silence as tacit acceptance.
UNCLOS defines internal waters as those on the landward side of the baseline from which a coastal state’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea is measured.
Internal waters include ports, rivers, inland waterways and the “near shore” (or “coastal waters,” if you use Beijing’s term). Those are enclosed between the low-water mark and the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
Coastal states have the same authority and sovereignty over those waters as they do over their land territory. For example, warships and commercial shipping have innocent passage through territorial waters but cannot enter “inland, coastal” or “near shore” waters without the coastal state’s permission.
There is no basis for China’s designation of the Taiwan Strait as “coastal waters.” It is an international strait as defined by Article 37 of UNCLOS. It is used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Moreover, before asserting in 2018 that the strait was not international waters, Beijing had acknowledged it as such. Now it has declared those waters to be its coastal waters.
UNCLOS Article 38 very clearly states that in straits used for international travel, all ships and aircraft have the right of passage; they shall not be impeded. China’s territorial waters, as defined by UNCLOS, do not extend across the entire strait.
That is why Beijing’s latest maritime territory declaration is so serious. Although the designation seems innocuous on the surface, it is in fact a maritime power grab initiated after a reputed five-day “maritime law enforcement operation.”
Beijing claims that it inspected more than 198 ships and craft during operations around Taiwan.
It also conducted marine research and bottom mapping of the waters east and northeast of Taiwan, no doubt to refine Beijing’s knowledge of undersea cable locations there.
With support from four coast guard cutters, the Maritime Safety Administration deployed three of its four largest patrol craft, displacing 5,000 to 10,000 tons. The majority of the Maritime Safety Administration’s nearly 300 patrol vessels displace less than 100 tons, but eight are oceangoing vessels that exceed the 3,000-ton displacement standard.
More important, as with all People’s Republic of China maritime forces, the Maritime Safety Administration’s strength is growing. Although Beijing said the operation was a response to the Manila-Tokyo discussions about their maritime boundaries, the operation and the new maritime claims that followed simply mark the latest step in China’s campaign to gain control over the air and sea lanes on which its neighbors and Taiwan depend.
Chinese Communist Party leaders will argue that claiming Taipei’s coastal waters as China’s own is consistent with Beijing’s position that Taiwan is a PRC province that does not accept national authority and governance.
Although that reflects China’s long-standing policy and position on Taiwan, this is the first time it has attempted to enforce its maritime regulations in those waters.
The impact extends beyond Taipei and, more ominously, represents a destabilizing escalation in the PRC’s intimidation operations against that government and its people. It also represents a potential precursor to a maritime exclusion zone around Taiwan.
Formally rejecting those claims is essential to deterring any PRC actions. Silence only encourages more aggression.
For example, past American silence after China seized or sealed off several of its neighbors encouraged Beijing to cement its control of those waters by constructing garrisons on the seized territories.
Western leaders should learn from those mistakes. Deterring aggression is far less costly than responding to an act of war committed by an aggressor that is convinced there will be no consequences.
• Carl O. Schuster retired from the U.S. Navy as a captain after 26 years of service and was a university lecturer in history and military science until 2025. He is a freelance writer with four books published, including “Israeli-US War on Iran: A Tutorial eBook,” available on Amazon.
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