OPINION:
Ideally, Iran should not be permitted to enrich uranium, even at the 3.67% low enriched uranium level.
That is enough for nuclear reactors to generate electricity, but not for a nuclear explosion. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not grant an unfettered right to enrich uranium. Even if it did, Iran’s egregious behavior should disqualify it.
Indeed, the NPT recognizes the right of non-nuclear-weapons states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Iran has approximately 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60% purity — enough for 12 nuclear weapons in a few weeks if enriched to 90%. It could be downblended to 3.67% in a nuclear weapons state such as Russia, China or the United States.
Can Iran be trusted to downblend this uranium — buried in deep underground hardened facilities — itself?
Enriched uranium for peaceful, civilian use is provided to non-nuclear-weapons states by Russia (Rosatom), France (Orano), a British-Dutch-German consortium (Urenco) and China (China National Nuclear Corp.). This is where Iran can and should acquire enriched uranium for peaceful, civilian purposes.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was opposed by some who took issue with the sunset clause that limited enrichment to 3.67% purity for 15 years, until 2031. After that, it depended on nuclear monitors gaining the access necessary to ensure Iran was not enriching at the 20% or 60% purity levels, a few weeks from the 90% purity level necessary for nuclear weapons.
The JCPOA also limited Iran to use first-generation centrifuges for 10 years (until 2026), after which more sophisticated centrifuges could be developed and used to enrich uranium.
Still, this should not be a contest between the JCPOA and whatever is decided during the upcoming 60 days of nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Our focus should be on Iran and how it has succeeded in persuading the U.S. and our allies and partners to trust it to enrich uranium at the 3.67% purity level for civilian use only. Iran was enriching at the 20% and 60% levels, seemingly threatening to go nuclear, despite its stated commitment not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.
It is now publicly known that before 2003, Iran had an active program to produce nuclear weapons.
The International Atomic Energy Agency reminds us often that its monitors in Iran were denied access to suspected nondeclared nuclear sites in Iran. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has criticized Iran for severely restricting or denying monitors access to its nuclear facilities.
The agency also lost knowledge of Iran’s nuclear materials and was thus unable to verify that the program was exclusively peaceful.
Yet this is more than the NPT and Iran’s so-called right to enrich uranium. It is about the regime’s evil behavior.
In 1984, the U.S. designated Iran the leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing funding, weapons, training and sanctuary to numerous terrorist organizations. Iran’s control of and support to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Houthis and the thousands of innocent people killed by these cowardly terrorist organizations must not be forgotten.
Similarly, we cannot forget Iran’s brutal treatment of its own people — the Green Movement in 2009, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in 2022, and the 2025-2026 protests — or its use of lethal force to crush any anti-government dissent.
This is the Iran we are dealing with. Is it the same one we can trust to enrich uranium to 3.67% purity for civilian, peaceful use?
As we prepare for the 60 days of nuclear negotiations, Iran’s theocracy must feel good about the $300 billion it will get for reconstruction and economic development and the lifting of sanctions to permit it to sell crude oil and diesel on the open market.
It likely also feels confident about the unfreezing of $100 billion for humanitarian use and Qatar’s immediate release of $6 billion, as The Wall Street Journal reported (and, of course, the lifting of the two-month U.S. blockade of Iran).
Iran’s supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said President Trump acted “out of desperation” to secure the agreement with Iran, while Iran acted “out of compassion and goodwill.”
Iran’s ballistic missile program and support to proxies should follow our scheduled 60 days of nuclear discussions with Iran. These programs are a threat to the region.
Clearly, Iran cannot be trusted to enrich uranium.
• The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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