OPINION:
On Oct. 9, after President Trump’s conversation with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, the Treasury Department issued a license easing sanctions on Russian diesel through April 7, 2027.
Critics have a point. A bipartisan group of senators called the arrangement “a gift to our adversary,” while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned it would embolden Russian attacks.
The naysayers have a point. The decision appears to undermine a Russia sanctions law that Mr. Trump signed only weeks ago.
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The president defended the move as a way to lower fuel prices, but the effect on American consumers is likely to be limited. The more important test is whether engaging Russia advances America’s long-term strategic interests.
Above all, Washington must prevent China, Russia, Iran and North Korea from turning their growing cooperation into a more powerful anti-U.S. coalition.
These countries do not share identical goals, nor have they formed a unified bloc. Still, their partnership is growing, and their combined resources could pose a serious challenge to American interests. Washington should therefore avoid any policy that pushes those countries toward closer coordination when differences among them might serve American interests.
The historical precedent is President Nixon’s opening to China in the early 1970s. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, exploited the growing split between Beijing and Moscow.
Their diplomacy changed the strategic balance of the Cold War. They did not need to trust China’s leaders. They needed to recognize that divisions between adversaries could benefit the U.S.
The comparison has limits, however. Nixon inherited an open and deepening Sino-Soviet split. Today, Russia and China have moved closer, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Mr. Putin has become increasingly dependent on Beijing for trade, technology and diplomatic support. Washington cannot assume that offering concessions will reverse this relationship.
Yet the partnership has weaknesses. Consider the proposed Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline, which Moscow has pursued to compensate for the European energy market it lost. Despite Mr. Putin’s efforts to secure Chinese backing, the project remained unresolved — no deal was reached during his May visit to Beijing.
Disagreements over gas prices suggest that Russia and China do not always have the same priorities. Although China has alternative suppliers and can afford to wait, Russia has few alternatives.
This imbalance offers Washington an opportunity, though not a guarantee of success. Russia may prefer its partnership with China to renewed dependence on the West.
Yet Mr. Putin also wants Russia to remain an independent great power, not a junior partner that must accept Beijing’s terms. As China gains leverage over Russian energy exports, trade and technology, Moscow has reason to preserve alternatives. The U.S. should test whether that desire for independence can produce practical limits on Russian-Chinese cooperation.
The goal should not be to turn Russia into an American ally or persuade Mr. Putin to abandon Chinese President Xi Jinping. That is unlikely. A more realistic objective is to reduce Moscow’s willingness to support Beijing in areas that threaten American security.
Even limited changes could matter if they constrain military technology transfers, weaken coordination among America’s adversaries or make Russia less willing to support China in a future crisis.
This is where Mr. Trump’s policy must prove itself. On its own, the diesel decision does not demonstrate strategic progress. It may provide Russia with additional revenue while weakening sanctions pressure, but nothing about it shows that Moscow will reduce its cooperation with Beijing, Tehran or Pyongyang.
So Washington should make engagement conditional. Any sanctions relief should be gradual, reversible and tied to verifiable Russian actions. The Trump administration should seek limits on sensitive military cooperation with America’s adversaries and a durable settlement in Ukraine backed by credible security arrangements. It should coordinate with European allies and avoid sacrificing Ukraine’s security for the appearance of diplomatic success.
The test must be results, not promises. If Russia accepts American concessions while deepening its strategic cooperation with China and continuing its aggression against Ukraine, Washington should restore the pressure. Yet if engagement produces measurable changes, even short of a major realignment, it could improve America’s strategic position.
Critics are right to warn that Mr. Putin may pocket American concessions and leave his partnership with Mr. Xi untouched. Yet refusing to explore diplomacy carries risks of its own. If Washington offers Moscow no plausible path to better relations, Russia has even less reason to reduce its dependence on China.
Ultimately, the question is not whether Mr. Putin deserves American trust. It is whether Washington can change its calculations in ways that protect American interests.
Mr. Trump may be right to see opportunity in Russia’s dependence on China. Still, an opportunity is not a strategy, and a concession is not a victory.
If the president wants to follow Nixon’s example, he must demonstrate that engagement is weakening the partnership between Moscow and Beijing rather than subsidizing it. The goal is not to make Russia a friend; it is to prevent America’s adversaries from becoming more dangerous by helping one another.
• Wahab Raofi is an Afghan-born American writer based in Orange County, California. A graduate of Kabul Law School, he writes on international affairs and geopolitics. His work has appeared in The Washington Post, The National Interest, The Huffington Post, NPR and other publications.
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