5 questions about Syria’s hidden nuclear reactor program

1. What did the IAEA reveal about Syria’s nuclear activities under Assad?

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said Syria was building a nuclear reactor during former President Bashar Assad’s rule that was configured to produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons. Grossi noted the program was never declared by the Assad government and was consistently denied.

2. Why does this matter?

Grossi called it “a very serious proliferation concern,” since the reactor’s technical features were described as highly efficient for producing fissile material that could be used directly to fabricate nuclear weapons. Inspectors also discovered a previously undeclared site containing around 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal in the form of fuel rods, material that experts say could be diverted toward a covert weapons program.

3. Who is involved?

Key figures include Grossi, who led inspection efforts, and Assad, under whose government the reactor was built with North Korean assistance in eastern Deir el-Zour province. Syria’s new government, which took over after Assad’s ouster, has since cooperated with the IAEA, notifying the agency of the hidden site in a July 17 letter and granting inspectors access.

4. What happened when inspectors investigated the site?

During an August visit, IAEA inspectors had to tear down walls and navigate narrow passages to reach nuclear material that had been deliberately hidden, with boxes scattered throughout the location. Inspectors confirmed the cooling infrastructure was consistent with that of a nuclear reactor and verified the presence of the uranium metal, which is now under IAEA safeguards with cameras installed at the site.

5. What happens next?

Grossi said it is up to the Syrian government to decide whether the nuclear material stays in Syria or is removed, emphasizing that the IAEA’s priority is tracking the material’s location at all times. Logan Mintz of the Nuclear Threat Initiative said that if deemed safe to move, the material could eventually be transported to a third country in certified containers for conversion into a more stable form usable in nuclear power plants, though such a transfer would require robust security against theft or sabotage.

For more on this report, read “Assad-era Syrian reactor was configured for nuclear weapons, says IAEA chief” from The Associated Press, published on The Washington Times.