- - Monday, November 11, 2013

That France’s socialist government of Francois Hollande just blocked a bad deal with Tehran, emerging as the hero of the Geneva negotiations, is on one level a huge surprise. It also follows logically, though, from the passivity of the Obama administration.

American foreign policy is in unprecedented free fall, with a feckless and distracted White House barely paying attention to the outside world, and when it does, acting in an inconsistent, weak and fantastical manner. If one were to discern something so grand as an Obama Doctrine, it would read: “Snub friends, coddle opponents, devalue American interests, seek consensus and act unpredictably.”

Along with many other critics, I rue this state of affairs. Still, the French action demonstrates that it does have a silver lining.

From World War II until President Obama waltzed in, the U.S. government had established a pattern of taking the lead in international affairs and then getting criticized for doing so. Three examples: In Vietnam, Americans felt the need to persuade their South Vietnamese ally to resist North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. During much of the Cold War, they pressured allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to resist Soviet pressure. During the 1990s, they urged Middle Eastern states to contain and punish Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

In each case, Americans rushed ahead on their own, then beseeched allies to work together against a common enemy, a completely illogical pattern. The nearby and weak Vietnamese, Europeans and Arabs should have feared Hanoi, Moscow and Baghdad more than the distant and strong Americans. The locals should have been begging the Yankees to protect them. Why was this persistently not the case?

Because the U.S. government, persuaded of its superior vision and greater morality, repeated the same mistake: Seeing allies as slow-moving and confused hindrances more than as full-fledged partners, it brushed them aside and assumed main responsibilities. With rare exceptions (Israel, and France to a lesser extent), the American adult unthinkingly infantilized its smaller allies.

This had the untoward consequence of leaving those allies with an awareness of their own irrelevance. Sensing that their actions hardly mattered, they indulged in political immaturity. Not responsible for their own destinies, they felt free to engage in anti-Americanism as well as other dysfunctional behaviors, such as corruption in Vietnam, passivity in NATO, and greed in the Middle East. Mogens Glistrup, a Danish politician, embodied this problem, proposing in 1972 that Danes save both taxes and lives by disbanding their military and replacing it with an answering machine in the Ministry of Defense that would play a single message in Russian: “We capitulate.”

Mr. Obama’s approach pulls the United States back from its customary adult role and has it join the children. Responding to crises on a case-by-case basis and preferring to act in consultation with other governments, he would rather “lead from behind” and be just one of the pack, as though he were prime minister of Belgium rather than president of the United States.

Ironically, this weakness has the salutary effect of slapping allies hard across the face and waking them to the fact that Washington has too long coddled them. Jaundiced allies such as Canada, Saudi Arabia and Japan are waking to the reality that they cannot take potshots at Uncle Sam, assured in the knowledge that he will save them from themselves. They now see that their actions count, a sobering new experience. For example, Turkish leaders are trying to light a fire under the Obama administration to intervene in the Syrian civil war.

Thus does the president’s ineptitude have the potential to turn reluctant, self-absorbed partners into more serious, mature actors. At the same time, his incompetence promises to change the U.S. reputation from overbearing nanny to much-appreciated colleague, along the way reducing ire directed at Americans.

Of course, a weak foreign policy presents the danger of catastrophe — such as facilitating an Iranian nuclear breakout or not deterring a Chinese act of aggression that leads to war — so this silver lining is just that, a small recompense for a much larger gray cloud. It’s not something to be preferred. Still, should two conditions be fulfilled — no disaster on Mr. Obama’s watch and a successor who reasserts American strength and will — it just might be that Americans and their allies look back on this period as a necessary one with a positive legacy.

Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum.