OPINION:
A sobering 2025 report by “60 Minutes” exposed America’s lack of preparedness for drone incursions around critical defense sites such as Langley Air Force Base in Virginia.
I was among the senior leaders who witnessed existing radar and counter-drone systems struggling to detect the threats of unmanned aircraft systems that are no longer theoretical.
In December, Congress responded with the Safer Skies Act, part of the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. It expanded counter-UAS authority and responsibilities, empowering state and local law enforcement to detect, track and often mitigate credible drone threats.
Jurisdictional paralysis was finally replaced with action. Unfortunately, legislation alone does not neutralize threats.
Authority is no longer the problem
For years, fragmented federal oversight left agencies without clear authority or effective counter-drone capabilities. Law enforcement was often sidelined, and there was no coordinated national approach.
The Safer Skies Act addressed many policy gaps by expanding federal detection and mitigation authority, establishing training pathways and unlocking funds for the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The National Defense Authorization Act expanded commanders’ authority to counter drones, established a centralized task force, classified unauthorized surveillance as dangerous and enabled faster protection of designated facilities and assets.
Yet policy is not enough. Drones remain difficult to detect with legacy systems designed for high-altitude aircraft and missiles. Electronic mitigation, such as jamming, induces safety concerns for civilian aviation. Nationwide low-altitude domain awareness is inadequate.
The challenge is no longer whether authorities can act but whether they can execute at scale and with speed.
The clock is ticking
The urgency becomes clearer with global events, including the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which culminates right outside New York City. High-visibility venues, mass gatherings and critical infrastructure represent attractive symbolic and operational targets.
Even a limited drone disruption would trigger chaos and fear, achieving even a psychological victory for our enemies.
Meanwhile, commercial drone technology advances on consumer-electronics timelines, with minimal barriers to entry. Threats evolve monthly while acquisition cycles take years.
Laws can authorize action, but they cannot manufacture sensors, compress procurement timing or rapidly deploy new technologies before the next geopolitical flash point.
Is the U.S. prepared? Only if oversight pivots from discussion to demanding these measurable outcomes. These include persistent, low-altitude detection and mitigation coverage for critical infrastructure, faster identification-to-response timing, and integrated government and commercial operations and procurement pathways aligned with commercial innovation cycles.
These are operational questions, not policy debates.
Counter-UAS cannot be peripheral
Counter-UAS operations can no longer be just add-ons to traditional air defense. Drone threats must be considered in all critical security planning, major events and joint operations.
Training exercises must stress platforms prepared for advanced and unauthorized UAVs with hostile, hidden operators. Intelligence units must integrate open-source and commercial data. Training pipelines must normalize drone threat environments.
Industry leaders are now helping to address these vulnerabilities. As an adviser for D-Fend Solutions, a company focused on RF/radio-frequency cybertechnology, I know that agile, software-defined systems exist and have had thousands of successful deployments.
The next phase of drone defense will not be solved by kinetic or jamming systems alone. It will require scalable, layered tools capable of detecting, identifying, controlling and safely landing drones without disrupting surrounding environments.
Policymakers must align procurement and acquisition with this reality.
The private sector already produces RF sensors, AI-enabled fusion systems and advanced mitigation platforms layered for sensitive environments.
Now industry leaders must partner aggressively with all stakeholders, participate directly in training programs and operational exercises and prioritize proven technologies over outdated systems.
Simultaneously, counter-UAS strategies must protect civil liberties and airspace safety. Authority must remain precise, accountable and transparent.
The Safer Skies Act reduced legal ambiguity and marked the beginning of a capability sprint, but mitigating the threat requires rapid detection, tracking, procurement and continuous technological adaptation.
Congress must fund these efforts at levels commensurate with risk. Our government, in partnership with the commercial sector, must accelerate the deployment of integrated systems, and industry must rapidly deliver safe, interoperable solutions.
History will not judge us on legislation alone. It will evaluate whether threats to critical infrastructure were safely detected, tracked and neutralized without disruption or worse.
The urgency is real. The framework is in place. Responsibility now lies with legislators, government leaders and industry innovators.
America’s airspace cannot afford another warning shot.
• Glen. D. VanHerck is a retired U.S. Air Force general and a former commander of the U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command.
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