OPINION:
Iraq faces one of the most consequential tests of its post-2003 era, one whose outcome could also shape the broader security and energy landscape of the Middle East.
At the heart of this challenge lies a fundamental question: Will the Iraqi state become the sole authority empowered to use armed force, or will parallel armed structures continue to operate as an entrenched part of the country’s political system?
That question is increasingly intertwined with Baghdad’s relationship with the United States. During Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s July visit to Washington to attend the U.S.-Iraq Business Summit, more than 50 agreements worth over $60 billion were announced.
Major international companies, including Chevron, ConocoPhillips, GE Vernova, BP, Shell, KBR and Excelerate Energy, were involved.
A substantial portion of these initiatives concerns oil, natural gas, electricity, infrastructure and the development of secure energy export routes. They suggest that relations between Baghdad and Washington have an opportunity to evolve beyond the predominantly military framework of the past two decades toward a broader economic and strategic partnership.
Yet one fundamental obstacle remains: the continued existence of armed centers of power that are not fully subordinate to the Iraqi state.
No investment worth tens of billions of dollars can be sustained over the long term without the rule of law, contractual security and political stability. From this perspective, bringing all weapons under state authority is a prerequisite for rebuilding state authority and establishing a stable economy.
The challenge is particularly complex owing to the network of hard-line factions associated with the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” It encompasses roughly 10 groups with an estimated combined strength of 50,000 armed personnel and arsenals of missiles and advanced weapons.
Several powerful Iran-aligned factions have resisted Iraq’s efforts to establish state control over these weapons. The issue is particularly urgent as Baghdad approaches the next phase of its security arrangements after the scheduled Sept. 30 transition of the U.S.-led coalition.
Such resistance is not surprising. For an organization that simultaneously possesses weapons, economic networks and political influence, disarmament can mean relinquishing its instruments of leverage.
Accordingly, disarmament must extend beyond the collection of weapons to include bringing chains of command, economic activities and, ultimately, decisions over war and peace under state authority.
The stakes become higher when Iraq’s possession of some of the world’s largest oil reserves is considered. At a time when the security of the Strait of Hormuz has once again caused major global concern, the development of more resilient routes for Iraqi energy exports is of growing strategic significance.
Iraq, therefore, has the potential to emerge as an important node in the Middle East’s energy security architecture. Yet achieving that position requires Baghdad to demonstrate that it can protect energy resources, pipelines and, most important, economic decision-making.
Washington also increasingly appears to view Iraq’s armed groups through an economic lens. The U.S. Treasury has imposed sanctions on Iran-aligned commanders, businesses and financial networks, while U.S. authorities have accused certain networks of exploiting Iraq’s economy to benefit Iran and affiliated organizations.
State sovereignty is essential. However, attempting to disarm tens of thousands of armed personnel without a carefully calibrated political and security strategy carries serious risks, as recent confrontations have demonstrated.
A sustainable strategy will likely require a combination of legal pressure, political negotiation, the dismantling of illicit economic networks, the integration of qualified personnel into legitimate state institutions and the dissolution of independent military command structures.
One principle should be nonnegotiable: In a state governed by law, there cannot be two independent authorities empowered to use military force.
This is also a test of President Trump, who presents himself as a dealmaker resolving difficult conflicts. Success will depend on whether commitments made in Baghdad produce measurable results.
The United States should approach the next phase with strategic caution. Reduction of American and coalition forces should not inadvertently create a vacuum that strengthens Iran-aligned armed groups.
In this calculation, the Kurdistan Region deserves particular attention. For decades, the Kurdistan Region has been one of the United States’ most dependable partners in Iraq. Properly understood, a strong and secure Kurdistan Region can contribute to a stronger, more stable federal Iraq.
Washington should ensure that its strategy does not weaken reliable partners at precisely the moment when Iran-backed networks may seek to exploit a changing security environment.
Supporting the Kurdistan Region’s security, economic resilience, constitutional rights and ability to attract international investment can form an important part of a broader American strategy aimed at strengthening Iraqi sovereignty.
If Baghdad can bring weapons under state authority without dragging the country into internal conflict and simultaneously separate economic activity from illicit networks and armed influence, Iraq could emerge over the next decade as one of the Middle East’s most important economic and energy centers.
The historic question is ultimately this: In Iraq, will the law have the final word, or will the gun?
• Rahim Rashidi is the Washington bureau chief for Kurdistan 24.
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