OPINION: Obama picks weak national security team

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By Melvin A. Goodman SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

Sixteen years ago, President-elect Bill Clinton headed for Washington with a national security team that was ill-prepared for a new age of foreign policy marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, ending the Cold War.

Mr. Clinton proclaimed upon arrival that "foreign policy is not what I came here to do," and the weakness of his national security team confirmed his attitude.

Unlike his economic team, which was marked by such stars as Lloyd Bentsen, Robert Rubin and Gene Sperling, Mr. Clinton's foreign policy team was mediocre at best. Its members soon were replaced.

Defense Secretary Les Aspin lasted less than a year. CIA Director Jim Woolsey remained less than two years. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser Tony Lake lasted through Mr. Clinton's first term; neither of them distinguished himself.

President-elect Barack Obama's appointments similarly demonstrate a focus on economic policy and that he will put foreign policy on the backburner. His economic team is star-studded and clearly prepared to take on the enormous economic challenges we face.

His national security team is composed of individuals with worldviews at odds with each other and with the views of Mr. Obama. There appears to be no commitment to reverse the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and no willingness to confront a Pentagon that the Bush administration has placed at the top of the foreign policy decision-making ladder.

The Bush legacy includes the weakening of the State Department and the militarization of the intelligence community, nearly all of whose intelligence departments and agencies are led by active duty and retired general officers.

Mr. Obama also has inherited a Clinton legacy marked by an unacceptable level of military influence over U.S. national security and foreign policy.

Mr. Clinton capitulated to military opposition agreements dealing with the International Criminal Court, a ban on land mines, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Warfare Convention. These decisions need to be reversed.

During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama took strong positions on stopping ethnic violence in Africa and elsewhere. But he should understand that the Pentagon opposes using military force for humanitarian missions. It delayed intervention in Bosnia to stop ethnic cleansing and advocated that the U.S. block U.N. efforts to stop the genocide in Rwanda.

Mr. Obama approaches office with a defense secretary -- Robert M. Gates -- who does not support many of the foreign policy positions that the president-elect adopted during the campaign; a secretary of state -- Hillary Rodham Clinton -- who was chosen for domestic political reasons; and without two key intelligence advisers -- a director of national intelligence (the so-called intelligence czar) and a director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

His national security adviser, retired Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones, while a solid performer, never has been known as a big thinker on foreign policy issues. His appointment, moreover, places another key position in the hands of the military.

The election appeared to give Mr. Obama a popular mandate to reverse the wrongful Bush administration policies on arms control and disarmament, the use of force and pre-emptive attack, the unilateral pursuit of U.S. goals and the unlawful policies of torture and rendition. The composition of Mr. Obama's team does not suggest a smooth transition toward reversing these policies.

For 16 years, the Clinton and Bush administrations have operated by the seats of their pants in the international arena, lacking any strategic policy planning. Mr. Obama appeared to offer better. Now, continuity appears to be the name of the game.

The National Security Council has been given to a retired marine general who does not know the foreign policy community. This will complicate his ability to create a strategic-minded staff.

The interim retention of Mr. Gates means that, while he may not appoint his own staff, he probably will have a veto on the appointments of the Obama administration. Worse, he will be advancing his own policy agenda, which includes a national missile defense at home, missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic and a new nuclear warhead for our strategic missile force.

Mrs. Clinton will have to get up to speed on difficult arms control issues and will need to rebuild and re-energize a department that has grown increasingly irrelevant. Although Mr. Obama criticized the militarization of the intelligence community during the campaign, he appears poised to name a retired admiral as director of national intelligence and, worse, retain retired Gen. Michael Hayden as CIA director.

With these inadequacies in personnel, it will be difficult to reform the policy process and flip the switch on a series of Bush administration decisions that have harmed the interests of the United States.

• Melvin A. Goodman, a CIA analyst from 1966 to 1990, is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and author of "Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA."