OPINION:
On Oct. 1, a new mobilization law will take effect in China — one that puts Xi Jinping’s stamp on mounting war preparations.
The measure, an update of the country’s 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law, gives China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, expanded ability to control the national economy, supply chains, technology and critical infrastructure. Enacted in late August, the law incorporates Mr. Xi’s “Military-Civil Fusion” principles into law, essentially harnessing all enterprises — whether public, joint venture or private — as well as schools, civil infrastructure, the populace and relevant technologies to support national defense.
It also expands the government’s authority to draft citizens across a wide age range into the armed forces or reserves.
As commander in chief of China’s Central Military Commission, Mr. Xi already possesses the power to mobilize the country against “threats to national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and China’s development interests.” The new law takes things a step further, enshrining his aggressive foreign policy precepts in national legislation.
Civilian resources can now be requisitioned for the “rapid transition from peacetime to wartime and to transform economic and social strength into national defense strength.” The central government likewise can dip into provincial and local budgets for national defense and mobilization needs under the statute.
By revising the National Defense Mobilization Law, Mr. Xi can tap into China’s high-technology sectors and the personnel who work in them in times of war or national emergency. That was one of Mr. Xi’s goals, as China is surging ahead in critical areas such as artificial intelligence and robotics. The central government will establish expanded stockpiles of critical materials and control their supply chains. In fact, the PLA would control the entire range of China’s critical infrastructure, roads, railways, telecommunications and space assets, and the PLA can requisition any materials or capabilities it needs.
The measure has Taiwanese analysts on alert, and for good reason. They have reasonably interpreted it as a means to prepare for military action against the island, “reunification” of which represents a cardinal priority for Mr. Xi and his leadership — particularly given that 2027 marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Liberation Army.
Yet the wording of the legislation suggests a scope that is larger still. Mr. Xi can invoke the law if he believes China’s control over the South China Sea, East China Sea or islands in dispute with other countries is threatened.
That should be of vital importance to the United States. In the East China Sea, China claims territories that are also claimed by U.S. allies South Korea and Japan. America has treaty obligations to come to their aid in the event of conflict. In the South China Sea, meanwhile, China has claimed islands also claimed by the Republic of the Philippines, a major ally for which the U.S. has prioritized defense and security cooperation. The U.S. is duty-bound to assist the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty; the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement further governs U.S. military access to Philippine bases.
The expanded mobilization law is not targeted against a specific country or state, making it a broad instrument. China, in other words, can initiate a national mobilization in the event of perceived threats or potential conflicts with the United States, Russia, India, Japan or any other country. The mobilization law can also be invoked to defend foreign interests or economic investments that Mr. Xi deems vital to national security.
Moreover, Mr. Xi is about to visit the United States, making the timing of the law a clear signal to Washington of China’s national interests and willingness to defend them.
As such, the expanded 2026 National Defense Mobilization Law is best understood as preparation for a possible protracted conflict.
This is so for good reason. The PRC has watched Russia struggle with its mobilization, materiel, drafting new troops, funds and supply chains for what has turned out to be a long conflict with Ukraine. Israel’s extended engagement in the Gaza Strip after Hamas carried out a campaign of terror on Oct. 7, 2023, is likewise instructive. So is the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iranian-controlled forces in Lebanon. Likewise, Mr. Xi is certainly aware of the effect of the U.S. military campaign against Iran on keeping the sea lines of communication in the Strait of Hormuz open and on U.S. defense stores.
All these developments offer lessons to Mr. Xi and the PLA regarding the potential drain on resources and personnel during a protracted conflict. China’s leadership is now doing something about it. The result will make an extended campaign against Taiwan even more likely.
• Larry M. Wortzel is senior fellow in Asian security at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington.
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