Defense and National Security Correspondent John T. Seward has more from Gen. Guetlein’s highly anticipated address at the Space & Missile Defense Symposium. Mr. Seward also spoke exclusively to Lt. Gen. Brian W. Gibson, the vice director of the Golden Dome project.

Here’s the big takeaway: The success of the Golden Dome ultimately depends on its funding, which remains a very open question in Washington. Gen. Guetlein called for “a different way of funding Golden Dome” rather than letting most of the project’s financing get caught up in Capitol Hill reconciliation and all of the political gamesmanship that goes along with it. He reiterated that the project’s price tag is still $185 billion.

But there’s another cash-related problem. Industry and congressional sources have told Threat Status that Golden Dome funding could be at risk if the Pentagon redirects some of that money to replenish the stockpiles of munitions, such as missile interceptors, that have been drained by the U.S.-Iran and Russia-Ukraine wars.

The U.S. war against Iran was supposed to last a few weeks, but it is nearing the six-month mark. And Mr. Trump seems trapped in a doom loop of violence and negotiations, hamstrung by an aversion to deploying U.S. ground troops and the tenacity of a regime that’s been on a war footing for decades.

There are numerous reasons why the war hasn’t played out the way the Trump administration planned. Here’s one of them: Iran’s Islamic regime has been in a war posture on and off since it seized control of the country in 1979, including a major conflict with Iraq in the 1980s. The lack of an embassy or U.S. presence during those decades makes gathering on-the-ground intelligence exceedingly difficult. As a result, it seems fair to say the administration misjudged the staying power and resilience of the regime in Tehran.

Politically, the November midterm elections hang over Mr. Trump’s wartime decisions, particularly the question of whether ground forces might be the only way to truly achieve all of America’s military objectives in Iran.

Threat Status Correspondent Jacob Wirtschafter has exclusive reporting on a key subplot of the U.S.-Iran war: whether powerful Persian Gulf nations will sign off on any plan that gives Iran effective control over the vital Strait of Hormuz.

Mr. Wirtschafter reports that Qatar has privately told the prime stakeholders — the U.S., Iran and Oman — that it would stop shipping altogether rather than pay to cross the Strait of Hormuz, as Tehran has insisted. Rashid Al-Mohanadi, of the Qatar-based Middle East Council on Global Affairs, said his country is “willing to close shop and wait this out.”

Qatar has proposed an alternative framework in which countries using the strait pay into a voluntary pool that would cover navigation services, environmental cleanup, search and rescue, and radar projects. But that framework would not include any payments to Iran for passage through the strait.

Two ex-Chinese military officers were arrested on suspicion of spying on two key American military installations, Kunsan and Pyeongtaek, in South Korea. It could prove to be a clear example of Communist China’s coordinated campaign to gain intel on U.S. bases across Asia. 

Asia Editor Andrew Salmon has more on this story, which was first reported by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency. One suspect, a Chinese national in his 60s who has visited South Korea multiple times since 2024, was arrested for allegedly listening to aerial control tower communications around Kunsan Air Base.

The other suspect was accused of recruiting a South Korean female employee at Camp Humphreys to supply classified materials about joint war games.

Here’s why China may want inside information on how the two bases operate: Kunsan, 114 miles south of Seoul, is home to the 8th “Wolf Pack” U.S. Fighter Wing and various support units, including air defense. The base has been used by U.S. troops since 1949. And Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek is the largest U.S. military base in the world outside the continental U.S. It houses the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea, the U.S. 8th Army and assets including a signals brigade and an intelligence brigade.

The very nature of combat is changing. And America’s ability to compete in modern warfare requires rebuilding the country’s munitions production base as soon as possible, writes Will Edwards in an op-ed for The Washington Times.

Mr. Edwards, the co-founder and chief executive officer of Firehawk Defense, argues the problem extends far beyond the headline-grabbing shortfalls of a few high-profile capabilities, such as Patriot missile interceptors.

“While certainly important, the number of Patriot interceptors is dwarfed by the number of additional artillery shells, rocket motors and propulsion systems required to fight a major ground war,” he writes. “Wars require massive amounts of conventional artillery and ammunition, far in excess of what America now produces. … The next conflict will be won by the side that has the most sophisticated equipment and can produce more of it.”

• Aug. 12-13 — Space & Missile Defense Symposium, Huntsville, Alabama

• Aug. 12 — DoDIIS Worldwide Conference 2026, Defense Intelligence Agency

• Aug. 12 — An Uphill Climb: Pushing for an Inclusive Political Dialogue in Afghanistan, Center for a New American Security

• Aug. 13 — Six Months After Epic Fury: The State of the Conflict in the Gulf, Hudson Institute 

• Aug. 17 — Beyond Pyongyang: Regional Development, Modernization and Inequality in North Korea, Stimson Center

• Aug. 18 — The Hormuz Implications for Energy Policymaking: Japan and South Korea, Center for Strategic & International Studies

• Aug. 25-26 — Counter UAS Summit, Institute for Defense and Government Advancement

• Aug. 27 — 2026 Navy Summit, Potomac Officers Club

• Aug. 27 — Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy on the Modern Battlefield, Atlantic Council