Thursday, November 19, 2026

Washington Times National Security Editor Guy Taylor moderates a discussion on what space superiority means now that U.S. satellites are under threat. They cover the push to build a resilient, multi-vendor constellation of hundreds of satellites, the race to scale production at speed and what the midterm results could mean for Golden Dome funding. 

The panel includes Dr. Gurpartap “GP” Sandhoo, director of the Space Development Agency; Dave Hatch of Lockheed Martin; Rob Mitrevski of L3Harris Technologies; and Michael Bergen of Vantor. 

[TAYLOR] I want to start with you, Director Sandhoo. That January 2025 executive order said outright that the threat of attack by ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles and other advanced aerial attacks remains the most catastrophic threat facing the United States. My question for you is, how do you see that? If we’re talking broadly about space as a national security domain, what is the biggest national security threat in space? Is it really missile defense related? Or is it also that an adversary could knock out U.S. civilian and/or military communications capabilities?

[SANDHOO] We spent a day on that. So I’ll neck it down from a missile warning, missile tracking, missile defense perspective just for this one. For the longest time, we had the space domain. We were able to do what we need to do in the space domain. You know, there’s always the five main functions in the weather, ISR, PNT, SATCOM, and space domain awareness, right? We have been doing this since the 60s for the Joint Force. Again, I’m talking from a national security perspective only here.

What has changed over the last 20 years or so is two things. One is that all our assets are now threatened by the adversary. That’s number one. Number two is, this is mostly for the terrestrial fight, our adversaries have built systems and sensors. They knew our space architecture. So, you know, if you go back 10 years, 15 years, SDA was stood up in 2019. I’ll get to why, to your question, in a second. The sensor coverage gap that we had, we had high, you know, geo satellites, geo satellites that could see down to a couple of kilometers. We had a ground system that could see up about 100 kilometers or so. But the adversary had built these hypersonics, the FOBS and the MOBS, all the systems that kind of flew in this sensor-layer gap. So in 2016 through 2019, there was a lot of discussion at the time with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering that we need to close the sensor coverage gap. So all these hypersonics fly in this sensor coverage gap.

SDA was stood up to close that gap. So all we did was bring all the sensors down. Well, when you do that, there’s a bunch of technical challenges you have to solve. There are not physics challenges because sensors are pretty good that we had, so they can detect these things, but how do you orchestrate that? How do you manage the network, essentially, of these 100 satellites now to do that? So those are some of the technical challenges.

But the bigger question is that now the space domain is somewhat threatened, so we have two jobs to do as a Space Force, and the Space Force stood up shortly thereafter. Number one is to take the analogy of the maritime domain. You have to protect and defend the domain so you can fight through the domain. Right? So the two big challenges that we have in the space domain is we have to be able to protect and defend the domain so we can do the fighting that needs to be done for the joint force. That becomes tracking the missiles, tracking the threats, being able to intercept those hypersonics, being able to deal with all those things. And that’s what we’ve been focused on. So those are two main functions. Protecting from the domain, and then be able to fight through the domain to support the fight.

[TAYLOR] The U.S. military, and you support this, I’ve done some research and seen you talk about it a little bit, the U.S. military is engaged in this strategic push for space superiority. You’ve mentioned the threats from adversaries. I assume we’re talking China. We’re talking Russia.

[SANDHOO] Yeah, absolutely.

[TAYLOR] But what does space superiority mean right now? If you could tell us a little bit more about the technical capability standpoint in 2027 and going forward.

[SANDHOO] Yeah, I won’t go around the weeds of that, but if you look at our architectures, we had geostationary satellites, single asset that can cover half the globe, three of them global coverage. Right, but it’s a single asset. When that is threatened, that asset is gone. So what do you do? Right? So we have to build, and for the longest time it was not threatened by anybody. There was nobody. It was a sanctuary. And as that has become threatened, we have to start looking how you build out a resilient architecture that you’re covering all your blind spots. LEO does certain things but is subject to other, you know, to other threats, you know, mostly from the ground because you’re close. GEO and HEO on the high layer are called the high layer. They have threats that are single points of failure.

So now that we are with this PAE construct, we are within the same PAE. We have LEO, we have MEO, we have the high layer. So we have to uncover all our blind spots. So if any regime is threatened, we can still do the mission. We still have to defend the homeland. We still have to defend the joint force and our allies.

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